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I. INTRODUCTION
The two jury trial provisions in the Constitution speak of
"crimes"' and of "criminal prosecutions." 2  It has long been recog-
nized that these two provisions are complimentary: A "criminal pros-
ecution" is a prosecution for "crime." The two provisions are thus
rooted in the same concept. Yet, the Constitution contains no defini-
tion of "crime," and there have been surprisingly few cases in the two
hundred year history of the right to trial by jury that explore the
meaning of "crime" in either provision. Without cause to explore its
meaning, we have assumed that the concept needs no definition. But
three recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have cre-
ated the need to examine the meaning of "crime" for the purpose of
the right to trial by jury.
First, in Duncan v. Louisiana,3 the Court held that the right to
"trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice," and as such, it is applicable to the states by virtue
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.'
i. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 provides that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases
of Impeachment, shall be by Jury ...."
2. The sixth amendment states that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.. U.S. CONST. amend IV
3. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
4. Id. at 149.
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Second, in Furman v. Georgia,5 the Court invalidated nearly
every capital sentencing statute in the nation. The terse per curiam
opinion and the five separate concurring opinions 6 raised more ques-
tions about the constitutionality of capital punishment than they
answered. Nevertheless, two messages were unmistakably clear from
these opinions. First, unfettered capital sentencing discretion violates
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment.
Second, the death penalty is not unconstitutional per se under the
eighth amendment. Capital punishment could again be employed if
the components of a just capital sentencing decision could be identi-
fied and fashioned into a formula that would produce rational, fair,
and reliable capital sentencing decisions.
State legislatures immediately accepted this challenge. In the
four year period between Furman and the Supreme Court's 1976
death penalty cases, more change occurred in the law of capital
crimes than in any other period in the history of Anglo-American
criminal law. The new post-Furman statutes amended the definition
of capital crimes and a number of states adopted capital sentencing
procedures that were unprecedented throughout the common law
world.
These new statutes created formidable theoretical problems. One
of these theoretical problems is the meaning of "crime" for the pur-
pose of the jury trial guarantee. The problem first arose with the crea-
tion of "aggravating circumstances" in the "alternative formulation"
of the Model Penal Code's capital sentencing procedure. Under this
procedure, aggravating circumstances function to create liability for a
death sentence and to guide the sentencing authority in assessing pun-
ishment. Since the "alternative formulation" adopts judicial sentenc-
ing, and since the determination of the existence or nonexistence of
the aggravating circumstances is made at a sentencing hearing by the
court alone, this procedure denies the right to a jury trial if aggravat-
ing circumstances are a crime within the meaning of the sixth amend-
ment guarantee. The problem created by the Model Penal Code's
"alternative formulation" remained benign until four states (Arizona,
Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska) patterned their capital sentencing
procedures on that provision in legislation adopted in response to
Furman. The validity of death judgments imposed under these proce-
dures is an issue currently pending before the Supreme Court.
5. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
6. Id. at 240-257 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at
306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring); id. at 314-74 (Marshall,
J., concurring). None of these five Justices joined an opinion written by his brethren.
1990]
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The third recent relevant decision is Spaziano v. Florida.7 In
Spaziano, the Court held that there is no right to a jury trial under
either the sixth or the eighth amendments in the sentencing phase of a
capital trial.8 This holding was recently refined in Hildwin v. Florida.9
In Hildwin, the Court held that the sixth amendment guarantee of the
right to trial by jury does not apply to a factually based sentencing
factor." If the aggravating circumstances in the Model Penal Code's
"alternative formulation" are properly classified as factually based
sentencing factors, then under these cases there is no right to a jury
trial of the determination of their existence or nonexistence.
This Article explores the theoretical distinction between what is
meant by a "crime," as contrasted with a "sentencing factor." Since
the Constitution's guarantee of the right to a jury trial is one of the
principal ways the framers of the Constitution sought to prevent
oppression of the people by government, this Article is necessarily
concerned with the capacity of the aggravating circumstances to serve
as a tool of government oppression.
Section II of this Article briefly chronicles the development of
the law of capital homicide in America from colonial times to the
present. The goal is to explore the meaning of "crime" when our
nation was founded, to understand the conception of "crime" held by
the framers of the Constitution, and the viability of that conception
today. This Section will also provide an explanation for the etiology
of the "aggravating circumstances," and the context in which the the-
oretical problems are explored. Section III will discuss the right to
trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution in general, and defines the
problem which is the focal point of the remainder of this Article: the
conception of "crime" within the meaning of the sixth amendment
guarantee of the right to trial by jury. This Section will discuss, ana-
lyze, and criticize the use of "element analysis" to define what is
meant by a "crime." Section IV concludes that despite the use of
"element analysis" by all of the cases addressing this problem to date,
"element analysis" provides no satisfactory solution to this problem.
Section V will return to the sixth amendment guarantee of the
right to trial by jury and analyze the fundamental conception of
"crime" as it was probably understood by the framers of the Constitu-
tion and how it is understood today. This Article proposes that a
"crime" within the meaning of the sixth amendment guarantee of the
7. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
8. Id. at 465.
9. 109 S. Ct. 2055 (1989).
10. Id. at 2057.
[Vol. 44:643
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right to trial by jury is a factually based rule (or a package of rules)
that creates liability for punishment. A crime either (1) creates liabil-
ity for punishment for what was previously lawful conduct, or (2) it
creates liability for enhanced punishment for conduct already subject
to a lesser punishment. In the former situation, the crime creates
original liability (as with the original homicide offense at common
law); and in the latter situation, the crime creates enhanced liability
(as with the distinction between murder and manslaughter at com-
mon law). This is the conception of "crime" incorporated into the
jury trial guarantee of article III of the Constitution. Furthermore,
this conception of crime is the common root between the article III
provision and the jury trial guarantee of the sixth amendment. It is
also the fundamental conception of crime we embrace today.
Section VI then proceeds to analyze the law of the sixth amend-
ment guarantee and how it should be applied to resolve the question
of whether a defendant is denied the right to trial by jury by the capi-
tal sentencing procedures in the "alternative formulation" of the
Model Penal Code and in the four states that adopted capital sentenc-
ing procedures patterned upon the Code's "alternative formulation."
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CAPITAL HOMICIDE
A. Great Britain
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment has succinctly
summarized the law of homicide in England-from soon after the dis-
covery of America to 1822-as follows:
By a series of statutes passed between 1496 and 1547, of which
the Act of 1531 (23 Hen. VIII, c. I) was the most important, mur-
der "of malice prepense" was largely excluded from benefit of
clergy. Up to this time all homicides, unless justifiable or excusa-
ble on the ground of self-defence or misadventure, were felonies
and therefore capital, but were within the benefit of clergy. Hence-
forward murder and what would now be called manslaughter, but
had then no specific name, were clearly distinguished. Murder,
which was unlawful killing with malice aforethought, was without
benefit of clergy and was therefore capital unless a pardon were
granted; unlawful killing without malice aforethought was within
benefit of clergy, which was finally abolished in 1827, and until
1822 it could be punished only by one years's imprisonment and
branding on the thumb."'
The punishment prescribed by law for murder is, and has been
II. Royal Commission On Capital Punishment, Report, Appendix 7, at 381 (1953)
[hereafter cited as "Report of the Royal Commission"].
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from ancient times, the punishment of death. If the jury convicts
an accused person of murder, the judge must, except in two special
classes of cases, pronounce the sentence of death, and has no dis-
cretion to impose any less severe sentence.12
Substantive criminal law throughout the United States is largely
founded upon the common law of England;'I and it is the body of law
summarized by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment that
formed the foundation of the American law of homicide. 14 Before
briefly tracing American developments, however, it should be noted
that until 1957, murder remained a unitary offense in England, pun-
ishable by a mandatory sentence of death. Then, in the Homicide Act
of 1957, for the first time in the history of English law, murder was
divided into a capital and noncapital crime."' The death penalty was
limited to five enumerated categories of murder 6 and to offenders
who committed "repeated murders."' 7 Nevertheless, the death pen-
alty remained the mandatory sentence for capital murder in Great
Britain until capital punishment was initially abolished in 1965 (for a
five year period),' 8 and permanently abolished for the crime of mur-
der'9 in 1970.20
12. Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted). The two classes of cases referred to in this passage are
persons under the age of 18 at the time of the offense (Criminal Justice Act, 1861) and
pregnant women (Sentence of Death (Expectant Mothers) Act, 1931). Id. at 5 n.2.
13. See, e.g., Ohio v. Lafferty, Tappan, 81 (1817) (reprinted in BEALE, A SELECTION OF
CASES AND AUTHORITIES UPON CRIMINAL LAW I (3d ed. 1915); Commonwealth v.
Chapman, 13 Mass. (Metcalf) 69 (1847); H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 1
(rev. ed. 1967); 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 451 (1983); Jones, The Reception Of
The Common Law In The United States, in JONES, KERNOCHAN, & MURPHY, LEGAL
METHOD, CASES AND TEXT MATERIALS 746-59 (1980); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOrr,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 57 (1972); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW (3d ed.
1982).
14. E.g., Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: 1, 37 COLUM. L. REV.
701, 702 (1937).
15. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2 c. II, section 5 (The Homicide Act 1957), 8 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF
ENGLAND 462-63 (3d ed. 1969).
16. Id. at 462.
17. Id. at § 6, p. 465.
18. 1965 c 71, (Murder (Abolition Of Death Penalty) Act 1965), 8 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 541 (3d ed. 1969). The Act was to continue in force until July 31,
1970, and then it would "expire unless Parliament by affirmative resolutions of both Houses
otherwise determines . I. " Id. at § 4, p. 543.
19. The 1965 Act abolished capital punishment for the crime of murder. It did not repeal
the death penalty for certain military offenses. As of 1981 the death penalty had not been
invoked for a military offense for over 30 years. See Rowe, Legislation, The Death Penalty, 44
MOD. L. REV. 696-97 (1981).
20. 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 357 (4th ed. 1985) ("This Act
was made permanent by virtue of affirmative resolutions of both Houses of Parliament on 16
and 18 December 1969.").
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B. The United States
1. FROM COLONIAL LAW TO 1972
It is generally understood that the English law of homicide was
well known in the American colonies, and that the framers of the
Constitution were familiar with the common law as expounded by Sir
William Blackstone.21 The First American Edition of his Commenta-
ries, published in Philadelphia in 1772, discusses the English common
law described by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, but
in greater detail. 22 Blackstone's discussion of the law of murder and
manslaughter, although quaintly phrased by current standards, would
be familiar to contemporary students of criminal law. Indeed, Black-
stone's definitions of murder and manslaughter are found in the cur-
rent California Penal Code in slightly altered form.23
More importantly, "it was the policy of Great Britain to keep the
laws of the Colonies in unison with those of the mother country. This
principle extended not only to the regulation of property, but even to
the criminal code." 24 For example, the royal charter to William Penn
directed that the laws of Pennsylvania "respecting felonies, should be
the same with those of England, until altered by the acts of the future
legislature, [which is enjoined to make those acts] as near, as conve-
niently may be, to those of England."25
To prevent too great a departure, a duplicate of all acts was
directed to be transmitted to England for the royal approbation or
dissent. Despite these provisions, the first criminal code in Penn-
sylvania, William Penn's code, made substantial changes in the crimi-
nal law. For instance, it abolished the death penalty for the common
law felonies of robbery, burglary, arson, and rape. Instead, these
crimes were punished by various terms of imprisonment, fines, and
21. Blackstone's Commentaries are accepted as the most satisfactory exposition of
the common law of England. At the time of the adoption of the Federal
Constitution it had been published about twenty years, and it has been said that
more copies of the work had been sold in this country than in England, so that
undoubtedly the framers of the Constitution were familiar with it.
Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904); see Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198-99
n.2 (1968); Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of Intel-
lectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731 (1976).
22. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 176-202 (1st Am.
ed. 1772).
23. Compare Blackstone, id. at 191, 195, with CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187-88, 192 (West
1988).
24. W. Bradford, AN ENQUIRY How FAR THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH IS NECESSARY
IN PENNSYLVANIA 14 (1793).
25. Id. Bradford continues, "and in order to prevent too great a departure, a duplicate of
all acts are directed to be transmitted, once in five years, for the royal approbation or dissent."
Id.
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forfeitures, rather than by the common law's mandatory sentence of
death.2 6 The death penalty was retained only for "wilful and premed-
itated" murder.27 Penn's code was ultimately sent to England for the
Crown's consideration. The Queen, in Council, repealed the entire
code. The code was then immediately re-enacted in Pennsylvania,
and it governed the Colony until 1718, a period of thirty-five years
from its original adoption.28 In 1718, "high handed measures" forced
the adoption of the "sanguinary statutes of the Mother Country."2 9
Under the new acts, a mandatory sentence of death was imposed for
all murder and other felonies punishable by death in England at that
time.30 In essence, the criminal law discussed by Sir William Black-
stone in his treatise was the statutory law of Pennsylvania until after
the American revolution.
The American revolution carried with it no concomitant rejec-
tion of English criminal law. 31 The law of murder remained as it was
before the revolution: it was a unitary offense, defined as it was at
common law, and punished by a mandatory sentence of death.32
Since manslaughter was not punishable by death in England, it was
generally not a capital crime in post-revolution America.33 But
reform of the criminal law did begin in 1786, when Pennsylvania
repealed the death penalty as the standard punishment for sodomy,
robbery, and burglary.34 Then, in 1794, Pennsylvania returned, in
essence, to William Penn's reforms of homicide law. 3" The Penn-
sylvania Legislature divided the offense of common law murder into
two distinct offenses: first degree murder and second degree mur-
der.36 The Pennsylvania statute limited the mandatory sentence of
death (the universal punishment for murder in those days) to the new
crime of first degree murder. The statute punished the new crime of
second degree murder with a term of imprisonment.37 The Penn-
sylvania Legislature adopted this new scheme for the single purpose
of limiting the death penalty to the most morally depraved and the
26. Id. at 15-16; see THE EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA 1681-1713 36-37
(J. Cushing ed. 1978).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 16-19.
30. Id. at 19-20.
31. See id. at 19.
32. Id. at 35-38.
33. Id. at 41-42 (commenting on the law of Pennsylvania as it stood in 1793).
34. Id. at 20-26.
35. 1794 Pa. Laws, ch. 257, §§ 1-2.
36. See Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA.
L. REV. 759, 764-73 (1949).
37. 1794 Pa. Laws, ch. 257, §§ 1-2.
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most deterrable of murderers.38
The Pennsylvania model 39 for grading murder into at least two
degrees for the purpose of assessing punishment steadily spread
throughout the United States.' By the time the United States
Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia,4 forty-one states used the
death penalty as a punishment for murder.4 2 The majority divided
murder into a capital and noncapital offense with a statute modeled
upon the 1794 Pennsylvania legislation.43 Only eleven states retained
the common law pattern as it existed in America before 1794,44 and as
it existed in England until 1957. In these states, murder remained a
unitary offense.
Although the Pennsylvania formula narrowed the murder offense
punishable by death to first degree murder, it did not alter the
mandatory character of the sanction. In the states adhering to the
common law's use of a single crime of murder, all murder was pun-
ished by a mandatory sentence of death.45 An automatic death sen-
tence thus remained the only punishment for capital murder
throughout the United States until nearly the middle of the eighteenth
century.46
The seeds of change, however, were sown by Tennessee in 1838.
In that year, the Tennessee Legislature abolished mandatory capital
punishment for first degree murder and inaugurated absolute capital
sentencing discretion. 47 The sentencing authority, whether judge or
jury, was given unfettered discretion to choose between the penalty of
38. See Keedy, supra note 36, at 769-73.
39. The Pennsylvania model is frequently referred to as the "Pennsylvania formula."
40. See infra note 43.
41. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
42. By the time Furman was decided, only nine states did not use the death penalty as a
punishment for murder. Id. at 372 app. I (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 385 n.7 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). By the time Furman was decided, capital punishment had been judicially
abolished in California. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152
(1972); see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Poulos, The Supreme
Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory
Capital Punishment, 28 ARIz. L. REV. 143, 144 (1986). Thus, on the day the Court decided
Furman, 40 states punished murder with a possible death sentence. Id. at 144-46.
43. Nearly 75% of the capital-punishment states did this. Poulos, supra note 42, at 148
n.56.
44. Id.
45. See supra text accompanying note 32.
46. In other words, in the states that divided murder into a capital and noncapital offense
along the lines of the Pennsylvania formula, first degree murder, the death penalty remained
the automatic punishment for everyone convicted of that offense. In the states that adhered to
the common law model which did not divide murder into a capital and noncapital offense, all
murder was punished by a mandatory punishment of death.
47. Act of January 10, 1838, Ch. 29, 1837-38 Tenn. Pub. Acts 55.
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death and life imprisonment.48 By the end of the nineteenth century,
twenty-three states had adopted the Tennessee method for imposing a
sentence of death for capital murder.49 By the fateful summer of
1972, the summer the United States Supreme Court decided Furman,
sentencing authorities throughout the United States5° were given
unfettered discretion to assess the punishment for murder at death or
a term of imprisonment, with but one exception." No rules cabined
or guided this sentencing discretion, and the decision to impose the
sentence of death was not reviewable by higher judicial authority.
5 2
The adoption of capital sentencing discretion made an important
theoretical change in the law: A distinction was drawn between liabil-
ity for the death penalty and the imposition of the death penalty.
Before capital sentencing discretion was adopted, the law defining the
substantive offense governed both liability for the death penalty and
the imposition of the capital sanction. After the adoption of unfet-
tered capital sentencing discretion, the law defining the substantive
offense still controlled liability for a death sentence, but not the ques-
tion of whether the death sentence would be imposed, which was
removed from the law's realm and committed to the grace of the sen-
tencing authority.
2. THE MODEL PENAL CODE
The adoption of capital sentencing discretion was the last major
innovation in the law of capital murder in the United States until state
legislatures responded to Furman.3 Nonetheless, there was wide-
spread dissatisfaction with the use of purely discretionary capital sen-
tencing by the time the drafters of the Model Penal Code began to
contemplate a "model" capital sentencing procedure.54 When the
Model Penal Code was finally promulgated, it took no position on
whether capital punishment should be retained or abolished for the
48. Id. For a discussion of the reasons behind the Tennessee Legislature's adoption of
unfettered sentencing discretion, see Poulos, supra note 42, at 148-55.
49. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 291 (1976).
50. See Poulos, supra note 42, at 248-51 table 2.
51. In all 41 states that punished murder with a sentence of death, either the highest
degree of murder (in states that divided murder into a capital and noncapital offense) or the
general murder offense were punished with a discretionary death sentence. See Poulos, supra
note 42, at 152-53. Delaware was the only exception. In Delaware, the general murder offense
remained punished by a mandatory death sentence. Act of Mar. 29, 1974, Ch. 284, § 4209, 59
Del. Laws (1973).
52. E.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 292, 307 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Poulos, supra note 42, at 153.
53. Poulos, supra note 42, at 155.
54. See, e.g., id. at 155-60; see also Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of
Homicide H, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261, 1308-13 (1937).
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crime of murder." Rather, the Code specified a capital sentencing
procedure that could be used as a "model" for states wishing to use
the capital sanction.
First, after criticizing the workings of the Pennsylvania formula
in the majority of American jurisdictions, the drafters of the Code
formally rejected the division of the crime of murder into a capital
and noncapital crime.56 Instead, the Code defined murder in essen-
tially the same way it had been defined for centuries at common law,
albeit with the use of different terminology. 7 A conviction of murder
under the Code would invoke the capital sentencing procedures of
Section 210.6.58
In sum, Section 210.6 provides for an entirely new system of
individualized capital sentencing. Once the trial judge makes a pre-
liminary determination that the death penalty is not precluded,59 a
separate sentencing hearing must be held to determine whether the
defendant should receive a sentence for a felony of the first degree or a
death sentence." The Code takes no position on jury participation in
the sentencing process when a jury trial determines guilt. An "alter-
native formulation" of the capital sentencing provisions was thus
included in the Code for use by states wishing to adopt judicial sen-
tencing. 6' It is this alternative formulation that concerns us here.
Under the alternative formulation, the trial court is the sole sentenc-
ing authority. The death penalty can be imposed only if the court
finds one of the enumerated aggravating circumstances, and also finds
that there are no mitigating circumstances "sufficiently substantial to
call for leniency."' 62 Beyond this, the court's discretion is guided by
the requirement that it must consider the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances "and any other facts it deems relevant." 63 The sen-
tencing decision is thus guided by the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. 64
Although the Code formally refused to divide the crime of mur-
der into capital and noncapital offenses, Section 210.6 achieves essen-
tially this same result by the use of what the Code calls "aggravating
55. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 comment 8, at 146-47 (1980).
56. Id. at comment 4, at 124-29.
57. Id. § 210.2.
58. Id.
59. Id. § 210.6(1).
60. Id.
61. Compare id. § 210.6(2) with id. § 210.6(2) (Alternative formulation). See § 210.6
comment 7, at 142-44.
62. Id. § 210.6(2) (Alternative formulation) & comment 8, at 148.
63. Id. 210.6(2) comment 8, at 108.
64. Id.
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circumstances. '65  Since a death penalty cannot be imposed unless
there is "proof of at least one of the enumerated aggravations to jus-
tify a capital sentence, ' 66 the aggravating circumstances function to
create liability for the death penalty. Indeed, the commentary
acknowledges that the list of aggravating circumstances could be used
to define "a class of capital murder. ' 67 This approach was rejected
because the drafters of the Code wanted to ensure that the aggravat-
ing circumstances found to exist are weighed against the mitigating
circumstances found to exist in assessing the punishment. And for
some unexplained reason, it was thought that this goal could be best
accomplished by contemporaneous adjudications of the existence or
nonexistence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 68 This
is the sole rationale for failing to use the aggravating circumstances to
subdivide murder into a capital and noncapital crime.
The Model Penal Code's use of the aggravating circumstances in
the penalty phase of the trial, rather than in the guilt phase, produces
a critical change in the law. The aggravating circumstances create
liability for the death penalty and operate as vital factors affecting the
imposition of a death sentence. Yet, the aggravating circumstances
are litigated only in the sentencing phase of the capital trial. 69 This is
the first time in the history of Anglo-American criminal law that a
rule that functions to create liability for punishment has been
removed from the guilt determination process (the guilt phase) and
allocated to a separate sentencing hearing (the penalty phase). At
common law, and in states that used the Pennsylvania formula, rules
defining the capital offense governed both liability for the death pen-
65. Id. § 210.6(3).
66. Id. § 210.6(3) comment 5, at 135.
67. The Commentary explains this decision as follows:
The discussion in the Advisory Committee reflected a strong sentiment in
favor of tighter controls on the discretionary judgment, the proposal having the
most support calling for proof of at least one of the enumerated aggravations to
justify a capital sentence. This might be achieved by constructing a class of
capital murder, subject to a discretionary death sentence, which lists the
aggravating factors in Section 210.6(3) as part of the definition of the offense.
Such an approach has the disadvantage, however, of according disproportionate
significance to the enumeration of aggravating circumstances when what is
rationally necessary is the balancing of any aggravation against any mitigation
that appear. The object sought is better attained by requiring a finding that an
aggravating circumstance is established and a finding that there is no substantial
mitigating circumstance. Put in this way, the exclusion of cases where there is no
aggravating circumstance is accomplished but the concept of a final judgment
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alty and the imposition of a death sentence. Furthermore, they were
litigated in a unitary trial.7° With the adoption of the Tennessee sys-
tem of capital sentencing, liability for the death penalty remained the
province of the substantive criminal law, but the imposition of the
death penalty was committed to the unfettered discretion of the sen-
tencing authority.7' In the few states that had separate sentencing
phases in the capital trial, the liability rules were litigated in the guilt
phase, whereas the life or death decision was made in the sentencing
phase of the trial at the sentencing authority's unfettered discretion.72
Since the Model Penal Code's aggravating circumstances both (1) cre-
ate liability for the death penalty, and (2) guide the sentencing author-
ity's discretion, allocating their litigation to the sentencing phase of
the trial was unprecedented.
As we have seen, the sole reason for litigating the aggravating
circumstances at the sentencing phase is to facilitate "the balancing of
any aggravation against any mitigation that might appear."73 Yet,
there is no indication in the Code's commentary to indicate that the
Institute recognized or considered what impact allocating the litiga-
tion of the aggravating circumstances to the sentencing phase would
have on the defendant's common law right to trial by jury. If the
aggravating circumstances were litigated in the guilt phase of the trial,
then their existence or nonexistence would be determined by the jury
as part of the capital offense. On the other hand, if the right to a trial
by jury attaches to the adjudication of the existence or nonexistence of
the aggravating circumstances, then the defendant's right to trial by
jury is abridged when the fact-finding decision on aggravating circum-
stances is allocated to the trial court in the "alternative formulation."
The probable explanation for the Code's failure to consider this
jury trial issue (even in the context of the common law or statutory
right to a jury trial) is that the drafters of the Code focused exclu-
sively on fettering the discretion of the Tennessee system with the new
70. See supra text accompanying notes 11, 44.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 47, 52.
72. At the time Furman was decided, only six states (California, Connecticut, Georgia,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas) used a separate penalty phase (or hearing) to determine
the sentence in a death penalty trial. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, ch. 1968, 1957 Cal. Stat. 3509; Act
of Apr. 22, 1972, ch. 56, 1972 Conn. Acts 50 (Reg. Sess.); Act of Mar. 27, 1970, ch. 1333, 1970
Ga. Laws 949; Act of July 6, 1971, ch. 1205, 1971 N.Y. Laws 2257; Act of Dec. 1, 1959, No.
594, § 1, 1959 Pa. Laws 621; Act of Sept. 1, 1967, ch. 791, § 11, 1967 N.Y. Laws 2138; Act of
May 1, 1967, ch. 659, § 22, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 1739.
In McGautha v.. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the Court rejected a claim that a
separate sentencing hearing is constitutionally required. "
73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3) comment 5, at 135; see supra text accompanying
notes 65-68.
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individualized sentencing procedure. The impact on the jury trial
right was apparently not a consideration because the Code took no
position on jury participation in the capital sentencing decision, and
because the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee was not applicable
to the states at the time the Code was promulgated.74 The drafters
simply failed to take this jury trial issue into account when they
drafted the alternative formulation of the Code's capital sentencing
procedure. In any event, one cannot fairly read the Code as striking a
balance between the facilitation of the capital sentencing process and
the defendant's right to trial by jury. Whether the Code's alternative
formulation violates the defendant's sixth amendment right to trial by
jury is the focus of the remainder of this Article. The issue depends
upon whether an aggravating circumstance is a "crime" within the
meaning of the sixth amendment guarantee. The issue arises because
the Code's alternative formulation was used as a model for the capital
sentencing procedures adopted in response to Furman in four states.
3. FURMAN
Although Section 210.6 offered an alternative to the use of unfet-
tered discretion in capital sentencing, and despite the growing criti-
cism of unfettered discretion as a lawless method for deciding who
dies, the Model Penal Code's capital sentencing procedures were not
adopted in any state by the summer of 1972. v5 Unfettered discretion
remained the American way of imposing the penalty of death.7 6
Thus, as the lawyers argued the constitutionality of capital punish-
ment under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment, and as the Justices pondered the fate of capital punish-
ment in the process of deciding Furman, their efforts were focused on
the purely discretionary imposition of capital punishment.
A bare majority of the Court decided Furman on June 19, 1972,
in a cryptic per curiam opinion.7 7 Though there were five votes sup-
74. Duncan v. Louisiana was not decided until six years after the Model Penal Code was
promulgated. The Official Draft of the Model Penal Code was adopted at the 1962 annual
meeting of the American Law Institute, which was held in Washington, D.C., on May 24,
1962. Model Penal Code, at title page. Duncan was decided on May 20, 1968. Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
75. One year before Furman, the Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws did adopt a capital sentencing procedure derived from the Model Penal
Code provision. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL
REPORT §§ 3602-3604 (1971). Unlike the Model Penal Code, the Final Report recommended
jury participation in the capital sentencing decision. Id. § 3602. These provisions, however,
were never enacted into law.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
77. The dispositive portion of the opinion reads as follows:
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porting the per curiam opinion, there was neither a majority nor a
plurality opinion supporting the majority's action.78 Instead, each of
the five Justices in the majority wrote separately, and none joined the
opinion of his brethren.79 Moreover, each opinion offered a different
rationale for concluding that unfettered capital sentencing discretion
violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment.8" Though the dissenters also wrote separately," three of the
four dissenting opinions were joined by the other dissenting Justices.82
A careful review of these opinions revealed that a majority of the
Furman Court agreed on two points: (1) unguided discretion to
impose capital punishment upon conviction of a capital offense vio-
lated the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause;
(2) under the Constitution, capital punishment was not per se inva-
lid. 3 Capital punishment could thus be restored so long as the sen-
tencing authority was not given unfettered discretion to choose
between life and death. What was unresolved, however, was whether
any discretion could be conferred on the sentencing authority after
Furman.s4
4. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO FURMAN
Essentially, two different interpretations of Furman emerged.
The first interpretation emphasized the fact that the discretion con-
ferred in the pre-Furman death penalty legislation was unfettered.
The court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in
these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment in each case is therefore reversed
insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are
remanded for further proceedings.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
78. See id. at 238.
79. These were the separate concurring opinions of Justices Douglas, id. at 240, Brennan,
id. at 257, Stewart, id. at 306, White, id. at 310, and Marshall, id. at 314.
80. See concurring opinions cited supra note 79.
81..These were the separate dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Burger, id. at 375-405, and
of Justices Blackmun, id. at 405, Powell, id. at 414, and Rehnquist (now Chief Justice), id. at
465.
82. See dissenting opinions cited supra note 81.
83. The concurring opinions of Justices Brennan, id. at 257, and Marshall, id. at 314,
concluded that capital punishment was per se unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual
punishment clause. The three remaining opinions supporting the Court's terse per curiam
opinion reached different conclusions. See id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring). The four dissenting Justices, of
course, believed that even unfettered capital sentencing discretion did not violate the eighth
amendment.
84. See Poulos, supra note 42, at 172-80.
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According to this view, it was the unguided nature of the discretion
that produced the constitutional flaw in the statutes invalidated by
Furman. Since individualized capital sentencing demands a measure
of discretion, a state could retain individualized capital sentencing so
long as a way could be found to guide the sentencing authority's dis-
cretion by appropriate legal standards.8 5 Although there was no pre-
cedent for this approach in Anglo-American law, the Model Penal
Code had created a guided-discretion capital sentencing procedure in
Section 210.6 of the Code ten years before Furman.6 Section 210.6
became the focal point for the guided-discretion interpretation of
Furman. Between June 29, 1972, the day Furman was announced,
and July 2, 1976, the day the United States Supreme Court first
addressed the constitutionality of the death penalty legislation
enacted in response to Furman, twelve states enacted legislation pat-
terned on Section 210.6.7 Two of these twelve states (Arizona and
Nebraska) patterned their guided-discretion capital sentencing proce-
dures on the "alternative formulation" of Section 210.6.88 In these
two states, the jury does not participate in the capital sentencing
process.
Under the second interpretation of Furman, the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause precluded all discretion in capital sentencing.
Since individualized sentencing is dependent upon a measure of dis-
cretion, individualized sentencing for capital murder would have to be
abandoned.8 9  Twenty-two states followed this interpretation of
Furman.9° Looking back at the model provided by the common law
as it developed in England and in America, the new capital statutes in
these states provided for a mandatory sentence of death for everyone
convicted of a capital offense. 9'
85. Id. at 180-200.
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1980).
87. See Poulos, supra note 42, at 199. These states were Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah.
Id. at 238-41 table 1. A thirteenth state, Texas, adopted an idiosyncratic approach to capital
sentencing. CRIM. PROC. CODE Act of June 14, 1973, ch. 426, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1122.
Texas adopted neither mandatory capital punishment nor a capital sentencing scheme directly
patterned on Section 210.6 of the Model Penal Code. Nevertheless, since the Texas statute
adopted individualized capital sentencing in a sentencing phase of a capital trial, the Texas
statute is more similar to the Model Penal Code provision than it is to the second widely
accepted interpretation of Furman. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Texas statute has been followed in only one other state-
Oregon. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.105, 163.150 (1989).
88. Poulos, supra note 42, at 198; see ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (1989); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 29-2519 to -2523 (1989); infra Section VII (Appendix).
89. See supra text accompany note 85.
90. Poulos, supra note 42, at 199.
91. Id.
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In 1976, the Supreme Court decided the first death penalty cases
since Furman. The Court reviewed Georgia, Florida, and Texas
sentences that were imposed under post-Furman statutes patterned
(in varying degrees) on the guided-discretion model contained in
Model Penal Code Section 210.6.92 The Court also reviewed North
Carolina and Louisiana sentences that were imposed under post-
Furman mandatory capital punishment statutes.93 The Court upheld
the guided-discretion statutes94 and invalidated the mandatory death
penalty statutes. 95 Subsequently, two of the states that had enacted
invalid mandatory death penalty statutes (Idaho and Montana)96
responded to the Court's 1976 decisions by adopting guided-discre-
tion statutes patterned upon the Model Penal Code's "alternative
formulation."
97
Thus, only four states with post-Furman death penalty statutes
(Arizona, Idaho, Nebraska, and Montana) have patterned their laws
on the "alternative formulation" of Model Penal Code Section
210.6.98 Like Section 210.6, each of these states uses aggravating cir-
cumstances both to create liability for the death penalty and to guide
the sentencing authority's decision.99 In each state, the determination
of the existence or nonexistence of aggravating circumstances is made
in the sentencing phase of the capital trial by the trial court alone.
Although the wisdom of this practice was questionable at the time the
Model Penal Code was promulgated, the Supreme Court's decision in
92. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
93. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976).
94. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259-60; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
95. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
96. See Poulos, supra note 42, at 238-41 table 1.
97. IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2515 to 19-2516 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301 to 46-
18-306 (1989); see infra Section VII (Appendix). Nevada, one of the original mandatory death
penalty states, subsequently adopted a guided-discretion statute that provides for jury
participation in capital sentencing. Judicial sentencing occurs only when the original
sentencing jury cannot reach a verdict. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 175.552, 175.556 (1985).
98. The Oregon death penalty initiative, which was adopted in 1978, also failed to provide
for jury participation in the capital sentencing process. Act of Dec. 7, 1978, ch. 2, § 3, 1979
Or. Laws 4-5, repealed by Act of Aug. 21, 1981, ch. 873, § 9, 1981 Or. Laws 1319. This statute
was modeled on the Texas statute upheld in Jurek. The only significant difference between the
Oregon and Texas statutes was that the Oregon statute made the trial court the sole sentencing
authority. Id. Since liability for the death penalty under this statute depended upon a factual
finding made at the sentencing hearing, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the Oregon
capital sentencing procedure violated the right to a jury trial secured by the Oregon
Constitution. State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 623 P.2d 630 (1981); see infra text accompanying
notes 220-32. The statute was then amended to make the jury the sentencing authority in
capital cases. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1987).
99. For a discussion of these statutes, see infra Section VII (Appendix).
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Duncan v. Louisiana ,00 intervened between the promulgation of the
Code and the adoption of these capital sentencing statutes. In
Duncan, the Court held that the sixth amendment right to a trial by
jury was applicable to the states by virtue of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.' 0' These are the first four states in the
history of the Anglo-American criminal law to allocate the determi-
nation of rules that create liability for capital punishment to the trial
court in a sentencing phase (or post-trial hearing) in a capital case."12
The remaining question is whether this procedure violates the right to
trial by jury guaranteed by the sixth amendment as it is made applica-
ble to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
III. THE MEANING OF "CRIME" AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
GUARANTEE OF A JURY TRIAL
A. Duncan v. Louisiana and the Right to a Jury Trial
Gary Duncan was charged with "simple battery," a misde-
meanor punishable by a maximum of two years' imprisonment and a
$300 fine in a lower court in Louisiana.' 3 The court denied Duncan's
request for a jury trial on the ground that the Louisiana Constitution
grants jury trials only in cases in which capital punishment or impris-
onment at hard labor may be imposed. ° He was tried, convicted,
and sentenced to serve sixty days in the parish prison and to pay a fine
of $150. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied discretionary
review,0 5 and Duncan appealed his conviction to the United States
Supreme Court on the ground that he was denied the right to trial by
jury guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution.10 6 The Court noted probable jurisdiction
on October 9, 1967,107 and on May 20, 1968, the Court issued its
landmark opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana 081 With only two Justices
dissenting, 0 9 the United States Supreme Court reversed Duncan's
100. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
101. Id. at 156. For a discussion of Duhcan, see infra text accompanying notes 103-15.
102. Although these four. states patterned their capital sentencing procedures on the
alternative formulation of Section 210.6, these were the first and only states to do so.
103. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 146.
104. Id.
105. State v. Duncan, 250 La. 253, 195 So. 2d 142 (1967). The entire opinion consists of
three sentences: "In re: Gary Duncan applying for writ of certiorari. The application is
denied. No error of law in the ruling complained of." Id.
106. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147.
107. Duncan v. Louisiana, 389 U.S. 809 (1967).
108. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
109. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. Id. at 171.
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conviction. 110
Justice White's opinion for the Court found that the right to a
jury trial in criminal cases is "fundamental to our system of justice,"
and thus applicable to the states under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. There were two rationales for this holding.
First, the history of the right to trial by jury in colonial and revolu-
tionary America, coupled with the inclusion of the jury trial guaran-
tee in both Article III and the sixth amendment, "is impressive
support for considering the right to jury trial in criminal cases to be
fundamental to our system of justice."1 '1 The second reason is the
purpose served by the right:
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order
to prevent oppression by the government. Those who wrote our
Constitution knew from history and experience that it was neces-
sary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to
eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of
higher authority. Providing an accused with the right to be tried
by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the common-
sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sym-
pathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it." 2
In other words, the right to a jury trial removes from the govern-
ment's arsenal the awesome power to directly impose the criminal
sanction on any citizen. In Blackstone's words, the right to a jury
trial is a "barrier ...between the liberties of the people, and the
prerogative of the crown.""' 3 This barrier withdraws the power to
impose the criminal sanction from the general government and allo-
cates it to an ad hoc body of citizens who are bound only to the law
and to the search for truth.
Consequently, the Court held "that trial by jury in criminal cases
is fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and "that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal
cases which-were they to be tried in a federal court-would come
within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.""' 4 Finding that a crime
punishable by two years imprisonment was an offense triable by a jury
under the sixth amendment, Duncan's conviction was reversed., 5
110. Id. at 162.
111. Id. at 151-53.
112. Id. at 155-56.
113. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *343.
114. 391 U.S. at 149.
115. Id. at 160-62.
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Since May 20, 1968, Duncan has guaranteed the right to trial by jury
on the issue of guilt or innocence in every state criminal prosecution,
unless it is for a "petty offense."
B. Spaziano v. Florida and the Distinction Between the Guilt and
Sentencing Proceedings
In August 1973, slightly over seven years after Gary Duncan
allegedly committed the simple battery against Herman Landry in
Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana,' 16 "Crazy Joe" Spaziano 1 7 allegedly
tortured, mutilated, and then killed two young women, depositing
their bodies in the Altamonte, Florida refuse dump.'18 Eventually,
the corpse of one of the victims was found, and Spaziano was indicted
for first degree murder.119 The State sought the death penalty.
The statutory scheme in Spaziano was adopted in response to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Furman.120 It provides for a trifurcated
proceeding. First, there is a guilt phase at which the issue of the
defendant's guilt or innocence of a capital offense is determined.'
2'
This trial is conducted in virtually the same way as in any other crimi-
nal trial in Florida. Florida law provides for trial by jury at the guilt
phase of a capital trial. 22 If the defendant is found guilty of a capital
offense by the jury at the guilt phase, then there is a second "advisory
sentence" phase of the trial. 23 In this phase, the jury hears evidence
relevant to the sentencing issue and renders an "advisory sentence"
based upon its determination of whether (a) sufficient aggravating cir-
cumstances exist as enumerated in the statute, (b) sufficient mitigating
circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances
found to exist, and (c) based on these considerations, whether the
116. After the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, the Louisiana Legislature reduced the
maximum sentence for simple battery from two years to six months. As result, Gary Duncan
faced retrial without a jury. See Duncan v. Perez, 445 F.2d 557, 559 n.2 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). Alleging that the pending retrial constituted "bad faith
harassment," Duncan sought to enjoin the state prosecution in the United States District
Court. The district court granted the requested relief. Duncan v. Perez, 321 F. Supp. 181,
184-85 (E.D. La. 1970). The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had
correctly anticipated the requirements of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Duncan v.
Perez, 445 F.2d at 558. Gary Duncan was thus never retried on the simple battery charge.
117. Spaziano v. State, 433 So. 2d 508, 512 (Fla. 1983) (McDonald, J., dissenting), aff'd,
468 U.S. 447 (1984).
118. Id. at 510.
119. Id.
120. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1976). The statute has been amended since
the Court's opinion in Proffitt, but those amendments are not relevant to our inquiry. See
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 451 n.4. (1984).
121. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (1989).
122. Id. § 913.10.
123. Id. § 921.141(1) - (2).
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defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.1 24 After
the jury renders its "advisory sentence," the trial proceeds to the sen-
tencing phase. In this phase of the capital trial, the trial judge con-
ducts another sentencing hearing and imposes the actual sentence.'25
The judge is not bound by the jury's advisory sentence and may
impose a sentence of death even though the jury recommends a life
term.' 2 6 The Florida trifurcated capital sentencing procedure was
upheld in Proffitt v. Florida,'27 one of the 1976 cases.
At the guilt phase of Spaziano's trial, a jury found him guilty of
murder in the first degree, a capital offense in Florida. 12 At the close
of the advisory sentence phase, the jury recommended a life sen-
tence. 12 9 Despite this recommendation, the trial judge sentenced
Spaziano to death. 3 ° On his first automatic appeal, the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, but vacated his death
sentence. 
3 1
On remand, the trial judge held a second sentencing hearing. At
the close of that hearing, the court reimposed the death sentence.
3 2
A second automatic appeal to the Florida Supreme Court followed,
and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of death.
133
Spaziano filed a timely petition for certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court, and the writ was granted on January 9, 1984.134
Although he raised a number of issues before the Court, only two are
relevant to the current inquiry.
First, Spaziano argued that the sixth amendment should be read
as guaranteeing the right to have a jury determine the sentence in a
capital trial. 35 Second, he argued that the eighth amendment's pro-
scription on "cruel and unusual punishment" also required a jury
determination in capital cases.' 3 6 Each of these arguments relied
124. Id.
125. Id. § 921.141(3).
126. Id.
127. 428 U.S. 242 (1976); see also Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 451 n.4. Though there were
intervening statutory amendments between Proffitt and Spaziano, these amendments neither
changed the basic structure of Florida's capital sentencing procedure nor did they affect the
analysis of the Spaziano opinion. Id.
128. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 451.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 451-52.
131. Id. at 452-53.
132. Id. at 453.
133. Spaziano v. State, 433 So. 2d 508, 512 (Fla. 1983).
134. Spaziano v. Florida, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984).
135. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 458.
136. Id. at 457-58.
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upon the undisputed notion that if one has a right to a trial by jury,
the jury's determination in favor of the accused may not be set aside.
On July 2, 1984, Justice Blackmun announced the opinion of the
Court in Spaziano v. Florida.'3 7 The Court rejected each of Spazi-
ano's arguments in an opinion in which six of the Justices joined.
38
Noting that Spaziano did "not urge that capital sentencing is so much
like a trial on guilt or innocence that it is controlled by the Court's
decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, "139 the Court emphasized that "a
capital sentencing proceeding involves the same fundamental issue
involved in any other sentencing proceeding-a determination of the
appropriate punishment to be imposed on an individual."' 40 The
Court then rejected the sixth amendment argument, holding that
"[t]he Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right
to a jury determination of that issue."''
Canvassing the Court's death penalty decisions since Furman,'
42
the Court found no principle which compelled jury sentencing in capi-
tal cases under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment.' 43 The fact that the cases consistently have recognized
the qualitative difference of the death penalty provided no support for
the argument.'44 Furthermore, the twin objectives of "measured, con-
sistent application and fairness to the accused"' found in those cases
did not require jury sentencing.14 Spaziano also argued that the prin-
cipal purpose that supported capital punishment was retribution-the
expression of community outrage-and that "[s]ince the jury serves as
the voice of the community, the jury is in the best position to decide
whether a particular crime is so heinous that the community's
response must be death." 47 Although Justice Blackmun's opinion
137. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
138. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The opinion was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and by Justices Powell and O'Connor. Id. at 449. Justice White joined the
Court's opinion and judgment, except for a dictum statement on an issue that is of no concern
to us here (the requirement that the jury be instructed on all lesser included offenses under
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980)). Id. at 467. Justice Rehnquist (now Chief Justice)
joined Justice White's opinion. Id. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissented on the question of "whether the Constitution of the United States permits
petitioner's execution when the prosecution has been unable to persuade a jury of his peers that
the death penalty is the appropriate punishment for his crime." Id.
139. Id. at 458.
140. Id. at 459.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 459-60.
143. Id. at 461-64.
144. Id. at 459.
145. Id. at 459-60.
146. Id. at 460.
147. Id. at 461.
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acknowledged that the "argument obviously has some appeal," it was
rejected for two reasons. 4 8 First, the distinctions between capital and
noncapital sentences are not constitutionally significant, for deter-
rence and retribution also fuel noncapital punishments. 4 9 Second,
accepting petitioner's premise that the retributive purpose behind the
death penalty is the element that sets the penalty apart, it does not
follow that the sentence must be imposed by a jury. 50 In the Court's
words, "[tihe community's voice is heard at least as clearly in the
legislature when the death penalty is authorized and the particular
circumstances in which death is appropriate are defined." ''
Finally, Justice Blackmun's opinion acknowledged that thirty
out of thirty-seven jurisdictions with capital-sentencing statutes allo-
cate the life-or-death decision to the jury.'52 Though only three of the
seven nonjury states allow the judge to override a jury recommenda-
tion of life, that fact "does not establish that contemporary standards
of decency [the standard used by the Court to give meaning to the ban
on cruel and unusual punishment] are offended by. the jury override.
The Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State reaches a
conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how best to
administer its criminal laws' '- 3 Since the demands of fairness and
reliability in capital cases do not require jury sentencing, and "neither
the nature of, nor the purpose behind, the death penalty requires jury
sentencing," the Court found that the Florida capital sentencing pro-
cedure did not violate the eighth amendment."'
C. The Problem When Aggravating Circumstances Create Liability
and Function as Sentencing Factors
In the October term of 1988, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
Spaziano's holding that there is no right to trial by jury in a capital
sentencing proceeding under the sixth amendment in Hildwin v. Flor-
ida. 5 In Hildwin, the Court also held that the sixth amendment does
not require trial by jury of "a sentencing factor that comes into play
148. Id.
149. Id. at 461-62.
150. Id. at 462.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 463-64.
153. Id. at 464. As we have seen above, the four states that do not permit jury participation
in the capital sentencing decision are the four that patterned their capital sentencing
procedures on the "alternative formulation" of Section 210.6 of the Model Penal Code. These
four states are Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska. See supra text accompanying notes
98-102.
154. Id. at 464-65.
155. 109 S. Ct. 2055 (1989).
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only after the defendant has been found guilty, . . . even where the
sentence turns on specific findings of fact."
15 6
At first glance, the law governing the federal right to a trial by
jury in a capital case seems clear enough. The sixth amendment guar-
antees the right to a trial by jury at the guilt determination stage of a
capital trial under Duncan v. Louisiana.157 But neither the sixth nor
the eighth amendment requires jury. sentencing under Spaziano v.
Florida"'5 or Hildwin v. Florida.59 Nor does the sixth amendment
require jury determination of factually based sentencing factors."6
Nevertheless, if we return to our analysis of the alternative provision
of the capital sentencing procedures in the Model Penal Code (that is
the section that provides for capital sentencing by the trial court with-
out any jury participation), a serious problem becomes apparent.'
6'
As we have seen, the aggravating circumstances in this provision
function in two ways: First, they create liability for the death penalty,
and second, they function as factually based sentencing factors.
1 62
Although Hildwin clearly holds that factually based sentencing fac-
tors need not be determined by a jury, a question is raised whether
Duncan requires that the factually based aggravating circumstances
be determined by a jury under the sixth amendment insofar as they
create liability for the death penalty?
The Model Penal Code's use of the aggravating circumstances in
the penalty phase of the trial to assess liability for the death penalty
was an important break with hundreds of years of precedent. When
that unique facet of the Model Penal Code's procedure is coupled, in
the alternative provision, with the trial court's determination of the
existence or nonexistence of the aggravating circumstance, the impact
on the common law right to trial by jury is unprecedented in the his-
tory of the Anglo-American criminal law. Does it also violate the
sixth amendment right to a jury trial under Duncan? To put the ques-
tion in slightly different terms, what is the constitutional line that dis-
tinguishes the sixth amendment right to trial by jury from the
Spaziano-Hildwin rule that neither jury sentencing nor jury determi-
nation of factually based special circumstances is required by the sixth
amendment?
63
156. Id. at 2057 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)).
157. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
158. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
159. 109 S. Ct. 2055 (1989).
160. Id. at 2057.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
163. Throughout this Article I refer to the sixth amendment right to trial by jury.
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1. LEGISLATIVE NOMENCLATURE
Because the principal purpose of the sixth amendment's guaran-
tee of the right to a trial by jury is to prevent government oppression,
it should be beyond argument that we cannot defer to the line drawn
by a legislative body. 64 Duncan establishes that this is so. Finding
no substantial evidence that the framers intended to depart from the
established practice of exempting "petty offenses" from the common
law right to trial by jury, the Court in Duncan held that the sixth
amendment guarantee does not extend to the trial of "petty
offenses." '165 But what is a "petty offense" for this purpose? Justice
White wrote for the Court:
In the absence of an explicit constitutional provision, the defi-
nitional task necessarily falls on the courts, which must either pass
upon the validity of legislative attempts to identify those petty
offenses which are exempt from jury trial or, where the legislature
has not addressed itself to the problem, themselves face the ques-
tion in the first instance. In either case it is necessary to draw a
line in the spectrum of crime, separating petty from serious
infractions. 166
This means that the nomenclature used by the legislature is not
determinative of a constitutional right.'6 7 Thus, a legislative body's
designation of a particular crime as a "petty offense" does not control
the sixth amendment right to a jury trial. 168 Rather, the task is to find
and apply objective criteria that substantively further the goals of the
sixth amendment guarantee.
1 69
The Court thus draws a line between serious and petty offenses
based upon "the seriousness with which society regards the
Technically, the sixth amendment is made applicable to the states by virtue of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 106-11. Since it is
awkward to refer to the jury trial guarantee in this way, I simply refer to the right to a jury
trial guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as "the sixth
amendment right." It should also be noted that though the sixth amendment right to trial by
jury may be waived by the defendant, I do not generally mention this fact in the body of the
Article because it produces awkward phrases.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 1 I 1-14.
165. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968).
166. Id. at 160-61.
167. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
266 (1970); Van AIstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
168. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-70, 73 n.21 (1970) (plurality opinion)
(White, J.). Justice White's approach in Baldwin has been unanimously adopted by the Court.
See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 109 S. Ct. 1289, 1291-92 (1989).
169. See Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68.
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offense."' 7 ° This is determined by looking to the maximum punish-
ment provided by the legislative body for the crime charged.' The
distinction between allowing a legislature to control the attachment of
the jury guarantee by defining the punishment available for the crime,
as opposed to allowing a legislature to control the jury guarantee by
characterizing the offense as petty or serious, is the distinction
between a substantive designation that furthers the goal of the sixth
amendment right on the one hand, and a purely formal rule that is
unrelated to that goal on the other hand. The goal of the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury is to prevent serious government
oppression. 72 That goal can be furthered best by a rule that measures
the maximum possible consequences of a conviction. A formal rule, a
rule deferring to legislative nomenclature, would permit the govern-
ment to oppress the people by any measure the legislative body
selected.
Thus, the fact that the common law rules defining the crime of
murder (or the aggravating or special circumstances in the mandatory
death penalty statutes) are generally referred to as the elements of the
crime or as creating categories of crime,17 3 whereas the aggravating
circumstances in the Model Penal Code are called "circumstances of
aggravation and mitigation"' 74 and "aggravating factors,"' 75 should
have no relevance in deciding whether the sixth amendment guaran-
tee attaches. To hold otherwise empowers a court or a legislature to
dispense with constitutional rights by affixing labels to legal rules
regardless of how the legal rules actually function. The Constitution
restrains governmental power, not simply governmental words.
2. THE ALLOCATION TO THE SENTENCING PHASE
The fact that the Model Penal Code allocated the litigation of
aggravating circumstances to the sentencing hearing, rather than to
the guilt determination process, likewise cannot be dispositive of the
sixth amendment jury trial right. The sixth amendment right attaches
to the guilt-innocence determination in a state capital case under
Duncan v. Louisiana.'76 But there is no right to a jury in a capital
170. Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at 1292; Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68.
171. Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at 1292, Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68.
172. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156, 160 (1968).
173. See, e.g., Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 429, 556 P.2d 1101, 1105, 134
Cal. Rptr. 650, 654 (1976) (referring to the special circumstances in the California mandatory
death penalty statute as creating "categories of first degree murder").
174. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 comment 5, at 135.
175. Id. at 136; see infra text accompanying notes 191-93.
176. 391 U.S. 145 (1968); see, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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sentencing proceeding under Spaziano."'7 Thus, unless there is a sub-
stantive restraint on legislative power, a legislative body could avoid
the jury trial requirement -by allocating the determination of the exist-
ence of an aggravating circumstance to the sentencing hearing. But
the sixth amendment right to a jury trial serves as a restraint on legis-
lative power. 78 Quite obviously, the sixth amendment would fail to
cabin legislative choices if a legislature could control the jury trial
right by simply designating that the court rather than a jury try a
particular issue. There is no reason to permit a legislature to achieve
this same result by allocating the litigation of an issue to a portion of
the capital trial in which a jury is not required. 79 A rule permitting
such a result would wholly fail to serve the purpose for including the
right to trial by jury in the sixth amendment.18 1
Finally, a line cannot be drawn on the basis of the distinction
between the fact-finding process and the sentencing process: "The
purpose of trial by jury, as noted in Duncan, is to prevent government
oppression by providing a 'safeguard against the corrupt or overzeal-
ous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge.' ",181 The sixth amendment achieves this goal by interposing
the common sense judgment of a group of laymen between the
accused and his accuser, and by invoking the community participa-
tion and shared responsibility that results from that group's determi-
nation that the defendant is liable for punishment at the hands of
government.18 2 The government oppression restrained by the right to
a jury trial is the oppression of unwarranted punishment.
The sixth amendment creates this barrier to government oppres-
sion primarily by assigning the "truth-finding task... solely to juries
in criminal cases."' 8 3 Thus, the "common sense judgment" so critical
177. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
178. For example, in Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134 (1979), the Court held that a
provision of the Louisiana Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure that provided for a
jury trial of six persons, five of whom must concur to render a verdict, in criminal cases
punishable by imprisonment in excess of six months violated the sixth amendment right to a
jury trial.
179. Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 1988); State v. Quinn, 290
Or. 383, 403-04, 407 623 P.2d 630, 642, 644 (1981).
180. For example, a legislature would not be permitted to define a capital crime of homicide
and then allocate to the trial court at the sentencing hearing all questions concerning the
defendant's culpable mental state and all forms of justification and excuse, thereby making
liability for all punishment dependent upon the trial court's findings on these issues at the
sentencing hearing. This would permit government oppression of anyone the jury finds
committed a homicide by using a judge who is "too responsive to the voice of higher
authority." Duncan, 391 U.S.,at 156.
181. Burch, 441 U.S. at 135 (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156).
182. See id.
183. Carella v. California, 109 S. Ct. 2419, 2420 (1989);- accord id. at 2422; Sandstrom v.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
to the central purpose of the right to trial by jury is the exclusive
power to determine the facts1 4, which in turn invoke the law gov-
erning the defendant's liability for punishment.8 5 Simply put, under
the sixth amendment "the function of the jury is to find facts."'18 6 But
once the jury finds the facts that invoke the law that, in turn, holds
the defendant liable for punishment, the purpose of the sixth amend-
ment is fulfilled.8 7 Since sentencing factors can be factually based,
however, and since Hildwin permits the trial court to determine factu-
ally based sentencing factors, identifying a decision as part of the fact-
finding process does not distinguish between the province of the jury
under the sixth amendment and the Spaziano-Hildwin rule (that
neither jury participation in capital sentencing nor jury findings on
factually based sentencing factors are required by the sixth or eighth
amendment).
3. A SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM
If neither the nomenclature used by the legislature, the allocation
of aggravating circumstances to the sentencing phase of the trial, nor
the fact-finding process can distinguish the sixth amendment right to
a jury trial from the Spaziano-Hildwin rule, how are the limits of the
sixth amendment guarantee to be determined? The inquiry begins
with the wording of the Constitution. Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution provides that "[tihe Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases
of Impeachment, shall be by Jury. . . ." The sixth amendment states
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979); United States v. United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422, 446
(1978).
184. The fact-finding function is assigned solely to the jury in a criminal case. Carella v.
California, 109 S. Ct. at 2422.
A defendant may assuredly insist upon observance of this guarantee [of the
right to trial by jury] even when the evidence against him is so overwhelming as
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That is why the Court has found it
constitutionally impermissible for a judge to direct a verdict for the state.
Id.; see supra note 112.
185. See White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a Capital Defendant's
Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1989).
186. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (White, J., concurring). The full
quote is as follows:
Although the function of the jury is to find facts, that body is not necessarily
or even probably better at the job than the conscientious judge. Nevertheless, the
consequences of criminal guilt are so severe that the Constitution mandates a
jury to prevent abuses of official power by insuring, where demanded, community
participation in imposing serious deprivations of liberty and to provide a hedge
against corrupt, biased, or political justice.
Id.
187. The restraint on warranted but oppressive punishment was not the concern of the sixth
amendment. The framers articulated the restraints on punishment in the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the eighth amendment.
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that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. . . ." These two
expressions are complementary: A "criminal prosecution" is the trial
of a "crime.""'. The question can now be recast: Is an "aggravating
circumstance" in the Model Penal Code a "crime" within the mean-
ing of the sixth amendment?
IV. ELEMENT ANALYSIS
The use of an aggravating circumstance to determine liability for
a death sentence at the sentencing phase of a capital proceeding first
appeared in the alternative provisions of the Model Penal Code's capi-
tal sentencing procedure.I 9 Since the entire history of Anglo-Ameri-
can criminal law contained no precedent for the use of factually based
rules creating liability for the death penalty in a sentencing hearing,
there was no need to analyze this question until Arizona, Idaho, Mon-
tana, and Nebraska adopted statutes based on the Code's alternative
provisions in response to the Supreme Court's death penalty cases. 190
All courts have addressed the question of whether these Model-
Penal-Code-type aggravating circumstances are "crimes" for the pur-
pose of the sixth amendment guarantee with essentially the same anal-
ysis. At best, this analysis attempts to define a "crime" by describing
its various component parts. Thus, a legal provision is a "crime"
rather than a sentencing factor, if it is an element of the offense.' 9' If
it is an element of the offense, then the sixth amendment right
attaches. 192 If it is a sentencing factor, then, under Hildwin, the court
can make the factual and legal determinations in a separate sentenc-
ing hearing without participation by the jury. 193 Since most of the
188. United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 481 (1896); see Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,
195-96 (1968).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
191. This analysis is implied in the following passage from McMillan: "Having concluded
that Pennsylvania may properly treat visible possession as a sentencing consideration and not
an element of any offense, we need only note that there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury
sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact." McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986); see also infra notes 88, 96-102 and accompanying text.
192. Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1023-30 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Adamson also
contends that the Arizona statutory scheme for imposing the death penalty erroneously lists
elements of the offense as factors to be determined by the sentencing judge, thus depriving him
of his right to a jury decision on the elements of the crime in violation of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments."); State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 399-40"7, 623 P.2d 630, 639-44
(1981) ("Obviously, the right of one accused of a crime to a trial by jury ... extends to all the
facts which constitute that crime, including the mental element.").
193. E.g., State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 247, 762 P.2d 519, 534 (1988); State v. Gillies, 142
Ariz. 564, 568, 691 P.2d 655, 659 (1984); State v. Blazak, 114 Ariz. 199, 205-06, 560 P.2d 54,
61 (1977); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 781 P.2d 197 (1989); State v. Charboneau, 116
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aggravating circumstances clearly do not define "whole crimes" under
element analysis, the point of the analysis is to determine whether the
''aggravating circumstance" at issue in a given case "aggravates" the
underlying crime into a capital offense. The theory is that the aggra-
vating circumstance enhances the crime of murder into capital-mur-
der in precisely the same way as the "elements" of first degree murder
under the Pennsylvania formula enhance the crime of murder into a
capital crime. 19 4 Applying this analysis to the Model Penal Code, the
underlying offense that qualifies a defendant for a capital sentencing
proceeding is the unitary offense of murder.195 If an aggravating cir-
cumstance is an "element" of an offense, the capital offense becomes
the crime of "aggravated murder." In this way, element analysis
seeks to define a "crime" within the meaning of the sixth amendment.
The idea that crimes are composed of various "elements" is not
deeply rooted in Anglo-American legal history. Under contemporary
element analysis, the components of an offense are placed into two
mutually exclusive categories: the actus reus (the physical component
of the crime) and the mens rea (the mental part of the crime). Yet the
term actus reus was not used in the older classical treatises (including
Blackstone) or in the works of Stephen, Holmes, or Bishop.'96
According to Professor Hall, the expression was introduced in the
twentieth century by Professor Kenny. 197  Since the adoption of ele-
ment analysis by the Model Penal Code in 1962,198 it has become the
most fashionable method for analyzing the criminal law. 199 Although
element analysis is widely accepted today, there is no evidence that
the framers of the sixth amendment intended the right to trial by jury
to attach only to the elements of an offense as we understand those
elements today.
There are, however, more fundamental objections to the use of
element analysis to determine the scope of the sixth amendment guar-
antee than the complaint that it has no foundation in history. Ele-
Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989); State v. Dawson, 233 Mont. 345, 358, 761 P.2d 352, 359-60
(1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3200 (1989); Fitzpatrick v. State, 638 P.2d 1002, 1012-13
(1981); State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 126, 444 N.W.2d 610, 643 (1989); State v. Palmer, 224
Neb. 282, 307-08, 399 N.W.2d 706, 724-25 (1986); State v. Moore, 210 Neb. 457, 463, 316
N.W.2d 33, 37 (1982); State v. Anderson, 207 Neb. 51, 72, 296 N.W.2d 440, 453 (1980); see
also State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 558-59, 250 N.W.2d 881, 887-88 (1977).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 65-72. *
195. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2, 210.6(1) (1980).
196. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 222 (2d ed. 1960).
197. Id. at 222 & n.24.
198. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
199. See, e.g., Robinson & Grail, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability. The
Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 691-702 (1983).
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ment analysis has as its central purpose the identification of the
components of the substantive criminal law and the analysis of their
interrelationship. It is a helpful method for deciding precisely what
mental state (mens rea) is necessary for each component of the physi-
cal part .(actus reus) of the crime.2 ° It also offers an explanation of
the relationship between the components of the crime and apparently
unrelated bodies of substantive criminal law, such as the law of mis-
take and accident. 20 ' But element analysis does not police the bound-
aries of the substantive criminal law. It is not designed to draw lines
between the substantive criminal law and another body of law, such
as the law of sentencing. It focuses only on the law placed within the
boundaries of the substantive criminal law by legislative bodies.
Consequently, it is not surprising that debates which resolve the
attachment of the sixth amendment guarantee by the use of element
analysis usually have all of the charm and sophistication of a school
yard argument. The defendant insists that the aggravating circum-
stance is an element of the offense, and the state insists that it is not,
because the legislative body has not placed the aggravating circum-
stance within the boundaries of the substantive criminal law. Typi-
cally, this "yes it is/no it isn't" argument is resolved in an opinion
that agrees with the state without ever satisfactorily explaining why it
has done so. 21 2 Since traditional element analysis is not equipped to
provide a solution to this issue and applies only to the law placed
within the realm of the substantive criminal law, such a case "cor-
rectly" rejects the defendant's argument that the aggravating circum-
stance is an element of the crime to which the right to a trial by jury
attaches. Meanwhile, the court ignores the defendant's rejoinder that
the right to a jury trial cannot depend upon an allocation made by the
legislature.
A. Element Analysis as a Substantive Limit
Although it has never protected the borders of the substantive
criminal law, should element analysis be expanded to include a polic-
ing function? In other words, should we create a new aspect of ele-
ment analysis designed to draw the boundaries between the
substantive criminal law and the law of sentencing? There is a certain
surface appeal to this suggestion. The elements of the substantive
offenses as they are defined by the legislative body virtually always
200. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.13, 2.01, 2.02; Robinson & Grail, supra note 199, at 694-
704.
201. Robinson &Grail, supra note 199, at 704.
202. Each of the cases cited supra note 193 are decided in precisely this manner.
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function to create liability for punishment. The elements of the crime
of murder at common law and the elements of the capital offenses in
contemporary American law function in this way. Since the right to a
trial by jury attaches to the determination of the elements of a crime,
alteration of traditional element analysis offers a possible solution to
the problem of identifying what is and what is not a crime for sixth
amendment purposes.
All of the elements of the various crimes and categories of justifi-
cation, excuse, and mitigation typically found in the substantive crim-
inal law have as their primary focus an event that occurs in the
objective world.2"3 This event (or series of events) invokes our analy-
sis of crime and organizes our thinking about the elements summoned
by the event. The event is fixed in time and space. Our approach to
the elements is similarly circumscribed. A crime is committed once it
is complete, and it is complete at a given point in time.2° Under this
view, a defendant's pre-crime 20 5 and post-crime conduct cannot be an
element of a crime.20 6 Pre-crime and post-crime conduct may be rele-
vant as proof of the crime, and it may influence the defendant's pun-
ishment.20 7 This perspective is so ingrained in the criminal law that
post-crime conduct or other rules that do not relate to the traditional
conception of criminal liability as being established when the crime is
committed are typically regarded as sentencing factors, rather than
elements of an offense. The capital sentencing statutes of Texas and
Oregon provide a ready example. These statutes establish a bifur-
203. See, e.g., J. HALL, supra note 196, at 222-25. There may be a series of events that must
have occurred for a crime to have been committed. Nevertheless, the last event necessary to
incur criminal liability is generally the initial focus of the analysis.
204. Of course, we have (or at least the legislative body has) control over when the crime is
found to be complete. It is a question of how the crime is defined. For interesting discussions
of the temporal aspect of crime, see Hoeber, The Abandonment Defense to Criminal Attempt
and Other Problems of Temporal Individuation, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 377 (1986); Kelman,
Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591 (1981).
205. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 462 (1978).
206. For example, Professors Perkins and Boyce write: "If the crime has once been
committed, it cannot be wiped out by a return of the property stolen, or restitution in any
other form. 'Ample authority exists that restitution does not nullify prior criminal activity and
allow the guilty party to escape prosecution.'" R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 335
(3d ed. 1982) (quoting Olassey v. Ramada Inn, 5 Kan. App. 2d 121, 124, 612 P.2d 1261, 1264
(1980)). With respect to condonation by the injured party, they write:
But the general rule is that a private individual has no power to ratify, settle
or condone a public wrong even if it was a wrong which injured his person or
harmed his property; and if he is able to do so it is only because of some
exception to the general rule and in the exact manner provided.
Id. at 1090-91. For an interesting discussion of restitution and condonation as liability rules,
see Hoeber, supra note 204, at 422-26.
207. G. FLETCHER, supra note 205, at 459-66.
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cated procedure. If a defendant is convicted of a capital offense, then
eligibility for a death sentence is determined in a separate sentencing
hearing. Only if the sentencing jury makes certain specified findings
in a special sentencing verdict may a defendant be sentenced to
death.2 °8 Both statutes define one of the required findings in the fol-
lowing terms: "whether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a con-
tinuing threat to society.
20 9
Under traditional element analysis, future dangerousness is a rel-
evant sentencing factor, 2 10 but it would not be classified as an element
of the offense because future dangerousness concerns the prediction of
post-crime conduct. Thus, if the sixth amendment right to a jury trial
attaches only to elements of an offense, there is no right to a jury
determination of this factually based issue.
Nonetheless, the Texas and Oregon Legislatures have defined
this particular feature so that it creates liability for capital punish-
ment in the sentencing phase of the trial. 21  The prosecution must
prove future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt, and a defend-
ant can receive a death sentence only if the jury answers this question
affirmatively.21 2 Fortunately, the Texas statute and the current Ore-
208. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1989); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071
(Vernon's Supp, 1989).
209. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(l)(b)(B); TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071(b)(1). The Oregon statute adds the following provision to this question:
In determining this issue, the court shall instruct the jury to consider any
mitigating circumstances offered in evidence, including, but not limited to, the
defendant's age, the extent and severity of the defendant's prior criminal conduct
and the extent of the mental and emotional pressure under which the defendant
was acting at the time the offense was committed.
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(l)(b)(B).
210. E.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 922, 1001-03 (1983).
211. Texas: TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.071(c) (e); see Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262, 267 (1976); Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Garcia v. State,
626 S.W.2d 46, 51-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Wallace v. State, 618 S.W.2d 67, 68-69 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981); see also Sanne v. State, 609 S.W.2d 762, 766-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(c), (e); see State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 142-45, 752 P.2d
1136, 1154-55 (1988) (relying on Jurek); id. at 222, 752 P.2d at 1201 (Gillette, J., joined by
Linde, J., dissenting). The Oregon statute is patterned upon the Texas statute. Id. at 142, 752
P.2d at 1154. But see State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 407, 623 P.2d 630, 644 (1981) (dictum
discussing the 1978 version of the Oregon death penalty statute that the court struck down for
violating the jury trial right guaranteed in the Oregon Constitution).
212. See supra note 209. In the Texas statute, the other two questions are the following:
"(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or
another would result;" and "(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant
in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.071(b)(1), (3) (emphasis added). Except
for the omission of the emphasized "the" in the Texas provision and the identification of the
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gon statute preserve the defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury
determination of this question.21 3 The use of conventional element
analysis, however, indicates that the right to a jury trial would not
attach to this determination.214 Since under conventional element
analysis the sixth amendment right to a jury trial attaches only to
"elements" of the offense, this would mean that the right to a jury
trial of this issue in Texas and Oregon is a matter of legislative policy.
Legislative policy can be changed in accordance with the legislative
will without violating the sixth amendment guarantee. Can element
analysis be modified to define the line between the right to a jury trial
and the Spaziano-Hildwin rule with complete accuracy? In other
words, can element analysis be modified to take into account "ele-
ments" that rely upon what had previously been considered pre-crime
or post-crime conduct? Probably.
Yet, even though element analysis is probably capable of being
altered in this manner, there is no good reason for insisting that the
right to a jury trial attaches only to an "element" identifiable by ele-
ment analysis. On the other hand, there are a number of reasons for
rejecting element analysis as determinative of the sixth amendment
right. Element analysis is already complex, and it would necessarily
become more complicated and ponderous if it were detached from its
current focal pint-the actus reus (physical component) of the
crime.2'5 The expansion of element analysis to police the border
between substantive criminal law and sentencing law might confuse
its use in analyzing the relationships between various components of
the substantive criminal law. The expansion of element analysis to
accommodate this new role might also lead to the creation of an entire
new body of law that in turn might unduly restrict legislative choices.
Once the new element analysis determines the right to a jury trial, it
may be argued that the sixth amendment requires that crimes be
defined in a particular way.216 Finally, there is the practical problem
of creating the new body of law that will serve both this policing func-
tion as well as the goal of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial.
subsections (from numbers to capital letters), the Oregon statute contains the identical
provisions. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(b)(A), (B).
213. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(a); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(a).
214. See State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 407, 623 P.2d 630, 644 (1981) (dictum discussing the
1978 version of the Oregon death penalty statute that the court struck down for violating the
jury trial right guaranteed in the Oregon Constitution).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 195-99.
216. For a similar argument, see Comment, Mens Rea and the Right to Trial by Jury, 76
CALIF. L. REV. 391 (1988).
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B. Element Analysis in Practice: Doctrine Stretched to the
Breaking Point
As we have seen, in most of the cases in which it is argued that
the right to a jury trial attaches to a particular feature of state law
because that feature constitutes an element of the offense, the court
has rejected the defendant's argument.217 In nearly every case, the
court reached its conclusion by simply agreeing with the state's asser-
tion that the particular feature was not an element of the offense. In
other words, the court did not attempt to alter the rules of element
analysis in these opinions. Instead, they ruled by judicial fiat.218 Con-
versely, the Supreme Court of Oregon, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and Amici Curiae in Walton v. Ari-
zona219 have attempted to alter element analysis to perform the polic-
ing function.
1. THE QUINN TEST (THE FIRST PRONG OF AMICI'S TEST IN
WALTON V ARIZONA)
In State v. Quinn,22° the Oregon Supreme Court invalidated the
State's 1978 capital sentencing procedure on the ground that the stat-
ute violated the defendant's right to trial by jury guaranteed by the
Oregon Constitution.22' The statute created a separate sentencing
hearing.22 2 The death penalty could be imposed only if the prosecu-
tion proved certain enumerated factors beyond a reasonable doubt.223
The trial court, at the separate sentencing hearing, was to make the
determination of the existence of each of the required factors.224 At
issue in Quinn was the following factor: "Whether the conduct of the
defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed delib-
erately and with the reasonable expectation that death of the deceased
or another would result.
'225
The court found that this provision creates "an additional ele-
ment of murder for which a greater penalty, death, may be
217. See supra note 193.
218. Id.
219. 159 Ariz. 571, 769 P.2d 1017, cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 49 (1989).
220. 290 Or. 383, 623 P.2d 630 (1981).
221. Id. at 407, 623 P.2d at 644.
222. Act of Dec. 7, 1978, ch. 2, § 3, 1979 Or. Laws 4-5 (codified as OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.116), repealed by Act of Aug. 21, 1981, ch. 873, § 9, 1981 Or. Laws 1322.
223. Id.
224. Id. The current death penalty law of Oregon uses the same three factors that were
enumerated in the 1978 initiative measure. See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
225. Though all three factors had to be found to exist before a death sentence could be
imposed, the court focused on this factor alone. Quinn, 290 Or. at 399-407, 623 P.2d at 639-
44.
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imposed. 22 6 The court then held that since the trial court was to
determine this element at the sentencing hearing, the statute violated
the defendant's right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Oregon
Constitution.227
The Quinn court offered the following distinction between an ele-
ment of an offense (which a jury must determine) and a sentencing
factor (which a court may determine):
The difference . . . is found in the simple principle that the facts
which constitute the crime are for the jury and those which charac-
terize the defendant are for the sentencing court.
* ' * Deliberation in the act of homicide is part of an act
declared by the legislature to be criminal. Because the extent of
punishment is to be determined according to the existence of that
proscribed fact, it must be proved at trial.
* The contrast is clear: Deliberate homicide is not a status;
it is an offense. If a defendant is to be punished for it, he is entitled
to require the state to prove it to a jury.228
The court then illustrated this distinction by contrasting the
(deliberate murder factor which was at issue in the case),229 with the
second factor enumerated in the 1978 statute, the future dangerous-
ness factor: "Whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society.
230
Under the court's analysis, the findings required by the future
dangerousness subsection characterize the defendant. They are conse-
quently findings "of the kind that may be properly considered by the
court 'for the purpose of determining the kind and character of a man
upon whom sentence is to be imposed.' ",231 The critical distinction
thus turns on the subject matter of the factual finding. If the factual
findings relate to the crime, then they are an element of the crime,
226. Quinn, 290 Or. at 403, 623 P.2d at 642.
227. Because ORS 163.116 authorizes an enhanced penalty to be imposed based
upon a determination by the court of the existence of the requisite culpable
mental state with which the crime was committed, a mental state different and
greater than that found by the jury, imposition of a greater penalty under the
statute denies to the defendant his right to trial by jury embodied in Oregon
Constitution Article I, section I 1 of all the facts constituting the crime for which
he is in jeopardy.
Id. at 407, 623 P.2d at 644.
228. Id. at 405-06, 623 'P.2d at 643.
229. For a reproduction of this factor, see supra text accompanying note 212.
230. Act of Dec. 7, 1978, ch. 2, § 3, 1979 Or. Laws 4-5, repealed by Act of Aug. 21, 1981,
ch. 873, § 9, 1981 Or. Laws 1322.
231. Quinn, 290 Or. at 406, 623 P.2d at 644 (quoting State v. Hicks, 213 Or. 619, 630, 325
P.2d 794 (1958)).
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which a jury must determine. If they characterize the defendant, then
they are sentencing factors, which the court alone may determine.
The Quinn test is seriously flawed. Since it appears as the first
prong of the test offered in an Amici Curiae Brief filed in support of
the petitioner in Walton v. Arizona,232 repetition can be avoided by
discussing the Quinn test and the test offered by Amici in Walton at
the same time. A writ of certiorari was granted in Walton on October
3, 1989.233 Question one in the petition is as follows: "Does Arizona's
death penalty statute violate the Sixth Amendment by denying jury
trial on factual elements of capital murder specified by state law?".
2 34
Since Walton presents the Supreme Court with the first opportunity
to resolve this sixth amendment issue, and since the Amici's argument
is one of the best attempts to use element analysis to resolve this issue,
this Section will analyze Amici's argument in some detail. Amici
offer the following test:
In constructing a constitutional role for the jury, the estab-
lished boundaries-supported by history as well as current
Supreme Court authority-are that the defendant has a right to
jury trial as to facts that are elements of a criminal offense but not
as to sentencing....
... [F]acts pertaining to the actus reus and mens rea of the
offense must be treated as elements of the offense to be determined
by the jury....
In situations where a factual determination leads to conviction
of a greater offense (or enhanced sentencing) as opposed to the
mere conviction of an offense, when should that determination be
treated as an element of the offense as opposed to a factor to be
considered at sentencing? Based on decisions of this Court, as well
as the historical concerns that underlie the right to jury trial, Amici
submit that the following test is appropriate: Facts that lead to an
enhanced sentence must be viewed as elements of an offense for
which a jury determination is required if two conditions are met.
First, the facts relate to the circumstances of the crime rather than
the character of the offender; second, proof of the facts makes pos-
sible a significantly enhanced sentence.235
When the elements of the offense define basic criminal conduct,
what Amici in Walton call "the mere conviction of an offense," Amici
apparently believe that no test is necessary for determining the ele-
ments of the offense. Apparently, any facts "pertaining to the actus
232. State v. Walton, 59 Ariz. 571, 769 P.2d 1017 (1989), cert. granted, Walton v. Arizona,
110 S. Ct. 49 (1989) (No. 88-7351).
233. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 49 (1989).
234. Id. at 49.
235. Amici Curiae Brief at 18-19, Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 49 (1989) (No. 88-7351).
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reus and mens rea" are elements of this offense. When the crime is
what Amici have called a "greater offense," or when the facts lead to
enhanced sentencing, Amici find it necessary to propose a two part
test for determining whether the facts giving rise to the legal rule con-
stitute an element of the offense for which a jury determination is
required.
The first requirement is that the facts must "relate to the circum-
stances of the crime rather than the character of the offender. '2 36 As
we have seen, this is the test used by the Oregon Supreme Court in
Quinn.2 37 There are a number of important reasons to object to the
Quinn test.
a. The Definitional Imprecision
Aside from the labels a legislature might give them, there is no
readily apparent distinction between facts that relate to the circum-
stance of the crime and facts that relate to the character of the
offender. It is not uncommon for a crime to be defined in terms of the
status of the offender at the time the offense is committed.238 For
example, persons who have been convicted of specified felonies are
sometimes prohibited from possessing certain property, though others
can legally possess that property. Thus, felons cannot own or possess
firearms capable of being concealed on the person, whereas others
may lawfully own and possess these weapons. 23 9 Does the conviction
of the first felony constitute a circumstance of the possession-owner-
ship crime or does it relate to the character of the offender? The
important point here is that both Amici and the Quinn court offer no
method for distinguishing between the circumstances of the crime and
character of the offender. There is no distinction in traditional ele-
ment analysis doctrine, because element analysis was not used to
police the boundaries between the substantive criminal law and sen-
tencing factors. Instead, traditional element analysis accepts the
designation set forth in the legislation. 24 If the facts form part of the
definition of the offense, they are an element of the offense, even
though they relate to the character of the offender. This explains why
236. Id. at 19.
237. See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
238. The Quinn court placed considerable emphasis on the distinction between an "offense"
and a "status," but the court offered no reason why a legislature could not make the status of
the defendant an element of a crime. See supra text accompanying note 228.
239. For example, it is an offense in California for any person who has been convicted of a
felony or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug to own or possess a concealable
firearm, though it is not a crime for others to do so. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12, 21 (West 1989).
240. See supra text accompanying note 201.
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most courts have resolved this issue by accepting the label affixed to
the feature by the legislature, rather than by ruling on the basis of a
substantive definition between the two sets of facts.
2 4 1
Let us assume, however, that we can fashion a rule that ade-
quately distinguishes between facts relating to the offender's character
and facts relating to all other aspects of the crime defined in the legis-
lation. Under Amici's argument, facts that relate to the character of
the offender (even though they are included in the definition of the
crime) are not elements of the offense. In the example of the crime of
possession or ownership of a concealable firearm by a convicted felon,
the defendant's prior conviction of the specified felony would not be
an element of the crime. Of course, this would be true even though
the crime were punishable only by a mandatory prison term. And
though the defendant's conviction of the prior felony is a critical fac-
tor in determining the defendant's guilt, the fact of the prior felony
conviction is not an element of the crime under this subject matter
definition. This definition conflicts with traditional element analysis
doctrine. The defendant's prior conviction of the specified felony is an
element of the offense under traditional element analysis.242 The
adoption of the subject matter definition would alter, rather than
extend, existing doctrine. The suggested test retains the traditional
concept of actus reus as being bound by time and space, but it appar-
ently seeks to alter our understanding of the components of the actus
reus and the mens rea in some undefined way. More importantly,
neither theory nor policy is offered as the rationale for adopting this
specific test.
b. The Definitional Arbitrariness
It is not apparent why the facts must relate to the "circumstance
of the crime" rather than the "character of the offender" to constitute
an element of a "greater offense" but not for "the mere conviction of
an offense. ' 24 3 Let us suppose that it is a crime for any psychothera-
pist to have sexual intercourse with a patient. The offense is classified
as a misdemeanor punishable by nine months imprisonment. Let us
also suppose that it is not a crime for any other person to do so. Since
it is a unitary offense and no other person is prohibited from engaging
in this conduct, it can be assumed that this is a crime that falls into
Amici's "mere conviction of an offense" category. In this situation
the defendant's status as a psychotherapist is an element of the
241. See supra text accompanying note 193.
242. E.g., People v. Hall, 28 Cal. 3d 143, 616 P.2d 826, 167 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1980).
243. See supra text accompanying note 235.
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offense, for it relates to the actus reus of the crime.2 " In a trial for
this offense, the jury must make the factual determination that the
defendant was a psychotherapist when the prohibited intercourse
occurred.
Now let us suppose that the legislature adds a new law to the
penal code. This new offense prohibits psychotherapists from having
sexual intercourse with patients, if the psychotherapist is more than
ten years older than the patient and the patient is under the age of
twenty-one. The new offense is a felony punishable by a maximum of
five years imprisonment. The Amici would presumably classify this
felony as a "greater offense" with enhanced sentencing. According to
Amici's suggestion, in this situation, the factual determinations con-
cerning the status and the age of the psychotherapist would not be an
element of the offense if it relates to the character of the offender.245
Why this would be so for the "greater offense," but not for the misde-
meanor offense needs justification. Yet Amici offer none.
c. The Questionable Use of History
There is no relationship between the first prong of the Amici's
suggested test (the Quinn test) and the purpose for the right to a jury
trial. We are told only that the first prong's requirement is "consis-
tent with the framers' probable view of the jury's fact-finding role,
'246
and that "[t]he focus upon whether the facts related to the circum-
stances of the offense rather than the character of the offender also
corresponds with the jury's historical role." '247 Although these asser-
244. See supra text accompanying note 196.
245. See supra text accompanying note 235. This discussion assumes that we can devise a
workable definition between these two sets of facts.
246. Amici Curiae Brief at 20, Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 49 (1989) (No. 88-7351).
247. Amici offer the following argument:
The focus upon whether the facts related to the circumstances of the offense
rather than the character of the offender also corresponds with the jury's
historical role. In the Middle Ages, jurors were selected because of their special
knowledge of the crimes committed. Thus, these jurors' fact-finding authority
naturally extended to all of the circumstances of the crime. By contrast, judges
would decide whether the defendant was eligible for benefit of clergy, a
determination largely dependent on an appraisal of the defendant's personal
characteristics.
Id.
The assumption that the jury did not determine the facts supporting a claim of benefit of
clergy because they were largely dependent on an appraisal of the defendant's personal charac-
teristics relies on a misconception of the purpose of the doctrine of benefit of clergy. The
doctrine began as a method for allocating jurisdiction between the ecclesiastical courts and the
common law courts. Gabel, Benefit Of Clergy In England In The Later Middle Ages, XIV
SMITH COLLEGE STUD. HIST. 1, 7 (1929). Since the facts supporting the plea of benefit of
clergy related to the jurisdiction of the court, the determination of those facts was properly for
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tions are not beyond dispute, it can be assumed that they accurately
reflect our experience with trial by jury.
This particular aspect of the Amici's argument focuses on the
type of fact-finding juries typically did at the time the sixth amend-
ment was adopted, rather than on the purpose of the sixth amend-
ment guarantee.248 Surely a legislature is not bound to define crimes
purely in terms of the kinds of facts found by juries when the amend-
ment was adopted. But the inevitable conclusion from this argument
is that the right to a jury trial attaches to fact-finding that is histori-
cally part of the jury's role at the time of the adoption of the sixth
amendment. Even if we assume that no jury in the entire history of
the common law ever determined a factual matter relating to the
defendant's character as part of its determination of the defendant's
liability for punishment, it is not reasonable to conclude that the
framers intended the sixth amendment jury trial right to be limited to
a historically based conception of the subject matter of the fact-find-
ing process as it then existed. 249 A subject matter requirement for the
attachment of the constitutional right to a jury trial simply does not
further the sixth amendment's purpose of guarding against govern-
ment oppression.
d. The Quinn Test as a Threat to Sixth Amendment Protection
Finally, the first prong of the Amici's suggested test (the Quinn
test) is both a rule of inclusion and a rule of exclusion. If the facts
relate to the circumstances of the crime, and if the second prong is
also met, then the factual determination is an 'element of the offense
for which a jury determination is required. If the facts relate to the
"character of the offender," then even if the second prong of the test is
met, this factual finding is not an element of the offense. This type of
factual finding is thus triable by the court alone under the sixth
the court and not the jury. That the court determined these jurisdictional facts teaches little, if
anything, about the jury's historical role over the determination of facts relating to the defend-
ant's personal characteristics in connection with the crime charged.
248. Though I have not looked at the evidence with respect to jury practices in Colonial
America, there is an Anglo-American tradition of defining offenses to include the defendant's
status. From at least the middle of the Fourteenth Century, the English Parliament used the
personal status of the defendant to define certain crimes. A good example is found in the early
English laws making vagrancy a crime. See Comment, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered:
Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 102, 104-07 (1962). This
practice was brought to Colonial America. See 5 TUCKER'S BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
168-69 (1969). Although the crimes may not have been triable by jury because they were petty
offenses, there is little basis in history supporting an argument that facts relating to the
character of the defendant are not or should not be within the scope of the jury's historical
fact-finding role.
249. See infra text accompanying notes 347-52.
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amendment. This would permit a legislature to base liability for
enhanced punishment upon a factual finding that relates to the "char-
acter of the offender," and allocate the determination of the existence
of that factually based liability rule to the trial court. Indeed, this is
exactly what the Quinn court suggested in its dictum statement con-
cerning the future dangerousness finding in the 1978 Oregon
statute. °
Again, this first prong of the Amici's test (the Quinn test) does
not further the sixth amendment's purpose of guarding against gov-
ernment oppression. A factual finding relating to the defendant's
character that creates liability for punishment is as capable of being
used as a tool for government oppression as is a factual finding relat-
ing to "the circumstances of the crime." The current Oregon death
penalty statute makes the death penalty dependent upon an identical
finding of future dangerousness. 25' Fortunately, defendants accused
of capital murder in Oregon need not challenge the Quinn dictum, for
the Oregon Legislature has protected the right to a jury trial by
statute.25 2
e. Summary
The first prong of the test suggested by the Amici in Walton (the
Quinn test) should be rejected as a method for drawing the constitu-
tional line between the right to a trial by jury and the Spaziano-
Hildwin rule that factually based sentencing factors can be deter-
mined by the trial court. The Quinn test offers no meaningful way of
distinguishing an element of an offense from a sentencing factor. It
does damage to existing element analysis doctrine and does not fur-
ther the goal of the sixth amendment jury trial right. Finally, it is
underprotective of the sixth amendment guarantee.
2. THE SECOND PRONG OF THE AMICI'S TEST
The second prong of the Amici's suggested test does not appear
in the Oregon Supreme Court's element analysis in State v. Quinn.
This prong is formulated as follows: "proof of the facts makes possible
a significantly enhanced sentence. ' 253 Since the Amici neither discuss
nor explain this prong of their suggested test, we cannot be sure of
precisely what they intend by this requirement. 2 4 Let us assume the
250. See supra text accompanying notes 228-31.
251. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
253. Amici Curiae Brief at 19, Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 49 (1989) (No. 88-7351).
254. This prong is mentioned only twice in the Walton Amici Curiae Brief. First, when it is
initially proposed, id. at 19; and second, when it is applied, id. at 23. In applying this prong,
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following interpretation: If the proof of given facts creates liability for
a significantly enhanced sentence, then the factual finding constitutes
an element of the offense when the first prong of the test is also met.
Since the feature in question is an element of the offense if both prongs
of the test are met, the sixth amendment right to a jury trial attaches
and a jury determination is required.
As so construed, there is a similarity between this second prong
of the test suggested by the Amici and the liability-rule analysis the-
ory of the attachment of the sixth amendment right.255 There are,
however, significant differences in the two approaches. The similari-
ties and the differences between the second prong of the Amici's pro-
posed test and liability-rule analysis will be considered later in this
Article.2 56
C. Adamson v. Ricketts
The final example of an attempt to mold traditional element anal-
ysis into doctrine that defines the line between the sixth amendment
right to a jury trial and the Spaziano-Hildwin rule is found in Adam-
son v. Ricketts.2 7 In Adamson, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, held that the Arizona capital sentencing proce-
dure violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury trial.2 8
Arizona's petition for a writ of certiorari is currently pending in the
Supreme Court.2 59
The Arizona statute, which is based upon the alternative formu-
lation of Model Penal Code Section 210.6, enumerates a list of aggra-
vating circumstances that are determined by the trial court at the
sentencing hearing. 260 Adamson was convicted of first degree murder
by a jury. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court found
two aggravating circumstances and ultimately sentenced Adamson to
death. Claiming that the aggravating circumstances are elements of
the crime of capital murder, Adamson argued that the judicial deter-
mination of the existence of the two aggravating circumstances vio-
Amici write: "The second prong of the test is also easily met. A finding that one of the
aggravating circumstances exists enhances the defendant's potential sentence from twenty-five
years to execution."
255. See infra notes 360-65 and accompanying text.
256. See infra text beginning with note 268.
257. 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
258. Id. at 1023.
259. Arizona's petition was filed on March 20, 1989. Ricketts v. Adamson, 865 F.2d 1011
(9th Cir. 1988), certfiled, 57 U.S.L.W. 3655 (Apr. 4, 1989). The Supreme Court has not ruled
on the petition. The Court appears to be waiting for its decision in Walton v. Arizona before
ruling on the Adamson petition.
260. For a discussion of the Arizona statute, see infra Section VII(A).
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
lated his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. Agreeing that the key
to the jury trial right lay in element analysis, the majority found that
the crucial issue was whether "the Arizona statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances are actually elements of a distinct crime. "261 In assessing
Adamson's claim, the court employed the following analysis:
[W]e examine (1) the legislative history of Arizona's death
penalty statutes; (2) the actual role played by aggravating circum-
stances under Arizona's revised statute § 13-703; and (3) the appli-
cation of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court's most
recent pronouncement on the distinction between elements and
sentencing factors, to this case.262
1. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Without announcing the purpose for including legislative history
as a component of element analysis, the court began by tracing the
evolution of Arizona capital homicide law from 1901 to the statutes
currently in force. 263 However, the court's "abbreviated legislative
history" was used only to provide context for the remainder of the
analysis2" and to serve as a basis for distinguishing several aspects of
the Supreme Court's holding in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.265 In addi-
tion to providing the court with the historical context in which the
challenged provision appears (which would be applicable to any case),
the court's implied goal for analyzing the legislative history of a
state's death penalty scheme was to assure that the legislature had not
changed the relevant statutes for the purpose of evading the constitu-
tional rights of the accused.2 66 Apparently satisfied that the Arizona
Legislature had a legitimate purpose in mind, the court proceeded to
the next component of its element analysis.
2 67
261. Adamson, 865 F.2d at 1024.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1024-25.
264. Id. at 1025. In dissent, Judge Brunetti wrote: "The history of Arizona's death penalty,
and the changes it has gone through are irrelevant so long as the statute applied here meets
constitutional standards." Id. at 1053.
265. Id. at 1027.
266. This is implied from the court's quotation of the following passage from McMillan:
"Thus, the [McMillan] Court concluded that 'the specter raised by petitioners of States
restructuring existing crimes in order to 'evade' the commands of Winship just does not appear
in this case.'" Id. (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477, U.S. 79, 89 (1986)).
267. The majority opinion is not entirely clear on this point. Near the end of the portion of
the opinionodevoted to the legislative history the court makes the following observation:
If this were the end of the analysis, however, Adamson's argument would
fail. Simply because Arizona previously assigned this decisionmaking
responsibility to a jury does not mean, of course, that the State must continue to
do so. However, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to invalidate sentencing
procedures when the process violates constitutional rights.
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2. THE ROLE OF THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
The critical component of the Adamson court's element analysis
focuses on the role of the aggravating circumstances in the Arizona
capital sentencing scheme. Four facets of that role were analyzed.
a. The Formal Role
The majority looked first at the formal scheme created by the
legislation. 26 The nomenclature used to identify the aggravating cir-
cumstances and the fact that the legislature allocated the determina-
tion of their existence to the trial court at the sentencing hearing
indicate that the legislature did not intend for aggravating circum-
stances to be elements of an offense. Thus, from the face of the stat-
ute, aggravating circumstances appear to be "mere factors guiding the
judge in his or her determination of the appropriate penalty.
269 If
the majority had employed traditional element analysis, then it would
have concluded at this point that the aggravating circumstances were
not elements of an offense. 27° But tacitly recognizing that the sixth
amendment right is a substantive restraint on legislative choices, the
majority looked beyond the "labels such as 'determinations of guilt'
and 'sentencing' " used in the statute to the functions actually per-
formed by the aggravating circumstances.27' In other words, the con-
stitutionality of the statute turns neither on what the Arizona
Legislature said, nor on what it intended to do. The court's critical
Id. at 1025 (citation omitted). The court then proceeded to analyze the aggravating circum-
stances to ascertain whether Adamson had been denied his right to trial by jury by the statu-
tory scheme under which he was tried. But later in the opinion, the court in distinguishing
McMillan, stated:
In contrast [with the scheme at issue in McMillan], Arizona's is a totally
revised statutory scheme which, when enacted in 1973, in essence withdrew from
the definition of its homicide crimes vaious "elements" traditionally preserved in
Arizona for jury determination and reclassified them as judicial sentencing cir-
cumstances. The confluence of the elements and circumstances, combined with
the simultaneous repeal of the statute allocating the burden of proving mitigation
at trial and enactment of the statute allocating this burden at judicial sentencing,
distinguishes Arizona's scheme from the one in McMillan."
Id. at 1027.
I am unsure why the court thought it necessary to distinguish McMillan in this fashion.
Furthermore, the court's subsequent discussion of McMillan does not reveal its purpose for
doing so. See infra text accompanying notes 306-08.
268. Adamson, 865 F.2d at 1025-26.
269. Id. at 1026.
270. Judge Brunetti employed the traditional element analysis and concluded that the
aggravating circumstances are sentencing factors. Id. at 1053-54 (Brunetti, J., joined by
Alarcon, Beezer, and Thompson, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
271. Adamson, 865 F.2d at 1025-26.
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inquiry was to determine what the Arizona Legislature actually did,
and the impact of that on the defendant's right to a jury trial.
b. The Procedural Functions and the Method of Litigation
According to the majority, aggravating circumstances perform
the following procedural functions or are litigated in the following
way: (1) "[A]n aggravating circumstance ... informs the prosecutor
what facts must be proven to obtain a conviction";2 72 (2) "[tlhe cir-
cumstance must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt"; (3) "[tlhe
hearing is adversarial, with oral argument and the prosecution's pres-
entation of evidence governed by the usual rules of evidence"; (4)
"[tihe presiding trial judge must make findings on the existence or
nonexistence of each of the statutory aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances"; (5) and "[i]f the judge finds an aggravating circum-
stance, the burden then shifts to the defendant who must put on
sufficient evidence of mitigation" to avoid imposition of the death
penalty.273 Since the elements of an offense have the same attributes,
and since they are litigated in the same way, these similarities indi-
cated to the Adamson court that the aggravating circumstances func-
tion as elements of the crime of capital murder.274
c. The Mens Rea of the Aggravating Circumstances
Both of the aggravating circumstances at issue in Adamson have
mens rea requirements.275 Partially relying on the Oregon Supreme
Court's opinion in State v. Quinn,27 6 the court found it significant that
"[t]hese assessments directly measure a defendant's 'moral guilt' and
overall culpability-traditionally the jury's domain of decision.
277
In a footnote, the Court observed that "[t]hese inquiries are identical
in essence to those required under the formal (statutory) distinctions
Arizona makes among homicides. The distinctions turn almost
272. Id. at 1026 (emphasis added). The court's analysis was not assisted by the inclusion of
the emphasized language. This language assumes the answer the court is seeking.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1026-27.
275. The two aggravating circumstances were the pecuniary-gain and the heinous-cruel-or-
depraved aggravating circumstances. Id. These two special circumstances read as follows:
"The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the
receipt, of anything of pecuniary value;" and "Itlhe defendant committed the offense in an
especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner." ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(5), (6)
(1989).
According to the majority, both of these special circumstances have a mens rea
requirement. Adamson, 865 F.2d at 1026.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 220-33.
277. Adamson, 865 F.2d at 1027.
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entirely on differences in the defendant's mental state, as this provides
a measure of culpability.""27 In other words, the aggravating circum-
stances at issue in Adamson function to determine the defendant's cul-
pability in precisely the same way that the mental elements of a crime
determine the defendant's culpability.
d. The Liability Function
The court gave equal importance to the fact that the aggravating
circumstances perform the same liability function as do the elements
of the crime: "If the prosecution is unable to prove the existence of a
single aggravating circumstance, like not proving an essential ele-
ment, the defendant cannot be put to death." '279
At the close of this portion of its analysis, the Adamson court
concluded by holding that "Arizona's aggravating circumstances
function as elements of the crime of capital murder requiring a jury's
determination."
28 0
3. 1MCMILLAN V PENNSYLVANIA
The Adamson court found further support for its holding in
McMillan v. Pennsylvania.2 81 Before examining why the Adamson
court took comfort in McMillan, we should have McMillan firmly in
mind.
The Pennsylvania Mandatory Minimum Sentence Act increases
the minimum sentence a judge can impose after a finding (made by
the judge by a preponderance of the evidence at a sentencing hearing)
that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commis-
sion of one of the offenses enumerated in the Act.282 The Act'does not
alter the maximum sentence specified for the underlying offense.
McMillan was convicted in a jury trial of an offense specified in the
Act-aggravated assault (McMillan shot his victim during an argu-
ment over a debt).28 3 Nevertheless, the sentencing hearing provided
by the Act was not held because the trial court found the Act uncon-
stitutional. The trial court then imposed a lesser sentence than that
required by the Act, and the state appealed.
McMillan made two arguments that were relevant to the Adam-
son court's analysis. First, he argued that visible possession of a fire-
278. Id. at 1027 n.28.
279. Id. at 1026.
280. Id. at 1027.
281. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
282. Id. at 81-82.
283. Id. at 82.
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arm is an element of the crime for which he had been sentenced; thus,
that element had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 4 Second, McMil-
lan argued that the Act denied him his sixth amendment right to a
trial by jury because an element of the offense (visible possession of
the firearm) was determinable by the court alone at the sentencing
hearing.285 The trial court apparently held the statute unconstitu-
tional on the first ground.286 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dis-
agreed and reversed the trial court's ruling. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court did not address the second argument (the violation of
the right to a jury trial).287 Certiorari was granted and the United
States Supreme Court affirmed.288
The Act at isssue in McMillan expressly provided that visible
possession "shall not be an element of the crime. "289 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court agreed. The visible possession requirement
was a sentencing factor, not an element of the crime.290 Relying on
Patterson v. New York,291 rather than on Mullaney v. Wilbur,292 the
Supreme Court permitted "the State [to pursue] its chosen course in
the area of defining crimes and prescribing penalties. '293 Although
the Court recognized that the due process clause imposes limits on the
State's power to do both, it held that Pennsylvania had not exceeded
those limits in this instance. In so holding, the Court found it signifi-
cant that the Act:
neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor
creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operates
solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a pen-
alty within the range already available to it without the special
finding of visible possession of a firearm.... Petitioner's claim that
visible possession under the Pennsylvania statute is "really" an ele-
ment of the offenses for which they are being punished ... would
have at least more superficial appeal if a finding of visible posses-
284. Id. at 83.
285. Id. at 93.
286. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 25, 31, 494 A.2d 354, 357 (1985). Four cases
involving the Pennsylvania Act were appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
McMillan's appeal was consolidated with the other three. Sandra L. Wright's appeal became
the lead case. The opinion in Wright disposed of all four cases. Id. at 25-28 nn. 1 & 2, 494
A.2d 355-56, n.l & 2.
287. See id. at 25, 494 A.2d at 354.
288. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82-83, 84-91.
289. Id. at 81 n.l.
290. Wright, 508 Pa. at 31-33, 494 A.2d at 357-59.
291. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
292. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
293. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86.
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sion exposed them to greater or additional punishment, ... but it
does not.294
In the next paragraph of its opinion, the McMillan Court distin-
guished Specht v. Patterson295 on similar grounds. Under the Colo-
rado statute at issue in Specht (the Sexual Offenders Act), conviction
of a sexual offense otherwise carrying a maximum penalty of ten years
exposed the defendant to an indeterminate term from one day to life
imprisonment if the sentencing judge made a post-trial finding that
the defendant posed "a threat of bodily harm to members of the pub-
lic, or [was] an habitual offender and mentally ill."2 96 The statute
provided that this factual determination was to be made by the judge
without a hearing, based solely on a psychiatric examination and the
resulting presentence psychiatric report.29 7 At the time set for sen-
tencing, without holding a hearing of any kind, the trial court made
the necessary finding (based upon a psychiatric report), and sentenced
Specht under the Sexual Offenders Act.298 Ultimately, the United
States Supreme Court unanimously held2 99 that the Colorado scheme
violated the due process clause."° In McMillan, the Court distin-
guished Specht on the ground that the finding provided by the Colo-
rado statute presented the defendant with " 'a radically different
situation' from the usual sentencing proceeding." '' But because the
finding of visible possession of a firearm only raises the minimum sen-
tence that the trial court may impose, Specht was clearly distinguish-
able.30 2  Accordingly, the Court rejected McMillan's due process
claim that the visible possession finding in the Act was an element of
the offense that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt.3 °3
The Court did not mention the fact that the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania failed to rule on McMillan's second argument.3° None-
theless, the McMillan Court did dispose of McMillan's claim that
judicial determination of the visible possession requirement violated
294. Id. at 87-88.
295. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
296. Id. at 607.
297. Id. at 607-08.
298. Id. at 608.
299. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for the Court. It was joined by every member
of the Court, except Justice Harlan. Id. at 606, 611. Mr. Justice Harlan agreed "with the
conclusions reached by the Court, but upon the premises set forth in his opinion concurring in
the result in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965)." Specht, 386 U.S. at 611.
300. Specht,.386 U.S. at 611.
301. 477 U.S. at 89.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 91.
304. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
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his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. This ruling required only
two sentences: "Having concluded that Pennsylvania may properly
treat visible possession as a sentencing consideration and not an ele-
ment of any offense, we need only note that there is no Sixth Amend-
ment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on
specific findings of fact."
°30 5
We now turn to the Adamson court's reading of McMillan.
McMillan supported the court's holding because, according to the
Adamson court, the Supreme Court "stated in McMillan that its
result could be different 'if a finding of visible possession exposed
[defendants] to greater or additional punishment.' "306 Implying that
this language created a constitutional rule, the Adamson court found
that the Arizona capital sentencing statute violated it:
Although first degree murder in Arizona is punishable by life
imprisonment or death, a defendant cannot, under any circum-
stances, be sentenced to death unless at least one aggravating cir-
cumstance is found to exist. Consequently, the finding of
aggravating circumstances "exposes [defendants] to greater or
additional punishment." Further, because proof of at least one
"aggravating circumstance" is required, capital murder becomes a
distinct offense calling for a separate punishment not otherwise
available-the penalty of death. 0
The court then distinguished Spaziano and held that "Arizona
has impermissibly identified elements of the crime of capital murder
as sentencing factors for determination by a judge, thereby removing
their consideration from a jury, in violation of the Sixth
Amendment."3"8
4. A CRITIQUE OF ADAMSON
At the outset, we may set aside the first prong of the Adamson
court's element analysis-the assessment of the legislative history of
the challenged capital sentencing procedure. The court's review of
305. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93 (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984)).
306. Adamson, 865 F.2d at 1027 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89). The Adamson
opinion continued as follows:
The Court placed great emphasis on the fact that the Pennsylvania statute
neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a
separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the
sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already
available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm."
Id. at 1027-28. The Adamson court did not quote the next sentence. It is quoted above. See
supra text accompanying note 294.
307. Adamson, 865 F.2d at 1028 (footnotes and citations omitted).
308. Id. at 1029.
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the statute's history uncovered no evidence that the Arizona Legisla-
ture was attempting to subvert or evade the sixth amendment right to
a jury trial when, in response to Furman, it adopted the capital sen-
tencing procedure based on the alternative formulation of Model
Penal Code Section 210.6. To the contrary, the evidence indicates
that Arizona was attempting to reenact a death penalty procedure
that conformed to the requirements of the Constitution. Whether
Arizona was successful in its labors, of course, is an entirely different
matter.
The central core of the court's element analysis is found in its
second prong. The Adamson court compared the functions of the
aggravating circumstances and the way they are litigated with the cor-
responding attributes of the elements of a crime. Since this compari-
son yielded no grounds for distinguishing the aggravating
circumstances from the elements of a crime, the court concluded that
the aggravating circumstances were elements of a new crime of "capi-
tal murder." This portion of the court's analysis can be separated into
four sub-categories: (1) the formal role played by the aggravating cir-
cumstances;3"9 (2) the procedural functions performed by aggravating
circumstances and the method of their litigation;31 0 (3) the mens rea
of the aggravating circumstances; 311 and (4) the liability function of
the aggravating circumstances.312
First, the Adamson court's analysis of the formal role played by
the aggravating circumstances in the Arizona capital sentencing pro-
cedure is unexceptional. A court must defer to legislative choices,
unless they impair constitutional rights. The nomenclature used in a
statute and the legislature's definition of the role played by a particu-
lar feature of state law is dispositive, so long as the statute is within
constitutional bounds. But when a statute is challenged under the
federal Constitution, the court must look beyond the labels used in
the statute to the functions actually performed by the challenged fea-
ture and its impact on the claimant's constitutional rights.313
Second, the Adamson court next turned to an analysis of the pro-
cedural functions of the aggravating circumstances and the method
used to determine their existence. Importance is given to the follow-
ing features of either the aggravating circumstances or how they are
litigated: they inform counsel of what facts must be proved for an
309. See supra text accompanying notes 268-71.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 272-74.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 275-78.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 279-80.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 268-71.
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affirmative finding, the standard of proof for criminal cases is
required, the hearing is adversarial with oral argument and the usual
rules of evidence governing the prosecutor's case, the judge makes
findings of fact, and once the judge finds the existence of an aggravat-
ing circumstance, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove mitiga-
tion.3 14 Since the elements of a crime have these same attributes, the
court is persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are elements of
a newly defined crime. It is here that the Adamson court erred.
Although the court is correct that these attributes and methods
are identical to the attributes of elements of a crime and the methods
used to prove them, that in itself establishes nothing. Other features
of state law that are clearly not elements of a crime might have the
same attributes and methods. For example, a legislature could assign
all of these same functions to a factually based sentencing factor and
provide for the same method for litigating its existence, and yet, that
would not convert the sentencing factor into an element of a crime." 6
Thus, California uses aggravating circumstances as factually based
sentencing factors.3 17 The jury is the sentencing authority in Califor-
nia when the right to trial by jury is exercised, and the sentencing
hearing is actually a phase of the capital trial that closely resembles
the portions of the trial that precede it.3 1  Although the legislative
body in California has not required that the prosecution shoulder the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for most of the aggravat-
ing circumstances, at least one of these sentencing factors so
requires.319 Consequently, the only "elemental" feature emphasized
by the Adamson court which is lacking in the California scheme is the
requirement that the trier-of-fact make specific findings on the exist-
ence of the aggravating circumstances. 320 But seldom is this required
314. See supra text accompanying notes 272-74.
315. See supra text accompanying note 274.
316. This follows from the Supreme Court's holding in Hildwin, which is discussed below.
See infra text accompanying notes 321-24.
317. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988).
318. See, e.g., Poulos, Capital Punishment, the Legal Process, and the Emergence of the
Lucas Court in California, 23 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 157, 190-91 (1990).
319. E.g., People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 726 P.2d 113, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986)
(when an uncharged crime is used as an aggravating circumstance it must be proved by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188
Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982).
320. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3. The burden shifting function is a feature of the
uncharged-crime aggravating circumstance in California: See the cases cited supra note 319.
Not all of the California aggravating circumstances function in this way, but that cannot be a
critical factor. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). The affirmative defense of
extreme emotional disturbance at issue in Patterson is not an element of the crime, but it
functions to shift the burden to the prosecution if the defendant's claim is to be defeated in the
same way that an aggravating circumstance in Arizona shifts the burden to the defendant. For
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even for an element of an offense. Normally, the jury can return a
general verdict in criminal cases.
Furthermore, the attribute identity aspect of the Adamson
court's element analysis is inconsistent with Hildwin v. Florida.32' In
Hildwin, the United States Supreme Court held that the aggravating
circumstances in the Florida capital sentencing statute are not ele-
ments of an offense. Rather, they are sentencing factors to which the
right to a trial by jury does not attach. The Court emphasized that
"[1]ike the visible possession of a firearm in McMillan, the existence of
an aggravating factor here is not an element of the offense but instead
is 'a sentencing factor that comes into play only after the defendant
has been found guilty.' ",322 Although the aggravating circumstances
in the Florida statute function in materially different ways than do the
aggravating circumstances in the Arizona scheme, they cannot be dis-
tinguished on the grounds that this portion of the Adamson court's
analysis equates the Arizona aggravating circumstances with the ele-
ments of a crime.323 Of course, since Hildwin was decided after
Adamson, we cannot fault the court for failing to consider that
case.3 24 Nevertheless, Hildwin demonstrates that this portion of the
Adamson court's analysis is wrong. The attributes of the aggravating
circumstances the Adamson court relied upon and the methods for
a discussion of the critical difference between the California aggravating circumstance as a
sentencing factor, and the Arizona aggravating circumstance as "crime" under liability-rule
analysis, see infra note 468 and accompanying text.
321. Hildwin v. Florida, 109 S. Ct. 2055 (1989).
322. Id. at 2057 (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)).
323. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (1985). At issue in Adamson were the motive-of-
pecuniary-gain and the especially-heinous-cruel-or-depraved aggravating circumstances. 865
F.2d at 1023. They are defined as follows: "The defendant committed the offense as
consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value."
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(5) 1989). "The defendant committed the offense in an
especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner." Id. Two of the four aggravating circumstances
at issue in Hildwin were substantially similar to the Adamson aggravating circumstances.
These were the pecuniary-gain and the especially-heinous-atrocious-and-cruel aggravating
circumstances. They are defined in the Florida statute as follows: "The capital felony was
committed for pecuniary gain." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(f). "The capital felony was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Id. § 921.141(5)(h). Although there is a difference in
the wording between the Arizona and Florida provisions, they apply to essentially the same
conduct. The aggravating circumstances in both Arizona, see infra Section VII(A), at 456,
and Florida must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Eutzy v.
State, 458 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1045 (1985). There is also no effective
way of distinguishing the method of litigating the existence or nonexistence of the aggravating
circumstances or their procedural function in the two states. There are, however, important
differences between the functioning of the aggravating circumstances in the two states that are
not relevant to the current discussion.
324. Adamson was decided on December 22, 1988, see Adamson, 865 F.2d at 1011, whereas
Hildwin was decided on May 30, 1989, see Hildwin, 109 S.Ct. at 2055. This part of the
Adamson court's analysis is also inconsistent with McMillan.
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their determination are not the exclusive properties of elements of a
crime. Worse yet, elements of a crime and factually based sentencing
factors commonly share these attributes and methods. Thus, an
attempt to distinguish the elements of a crime from a sentencing fac-
tor on these grounds is impossible.
(3) The mens rea of the aggravating circumstances:
Third, the court's reliance on the fact that the aggravating cir-
cumstances at issue in Adamson function to determine a defendant's
culpability in precisely the way that the mental elements of a crime
determine a defendant's culpability is subject to exactly the same criti-
cism. 325 This is also a common feature of sentencing factors. For
example, the California capital sentencing statute defines one of the
sentencing factors as follows: "whether or not the offense was com-
mitted under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed
to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct." '326 This
sentencing factor is obviously aimed at assessing the defendant's
moral culpability in essentially the same manner as the Arizona
aggravating circumstances.327 Thus, where it attempts to establish
that the aggravating circumstances are elements and not sentencing
factors because they function to assess the defendant's moral culpabil-
ity, the court's analysis in Adamson is fatally flawed.
3 28
Fourth, although the Adamson court did not emphasize the
importance of the liability function of the aggravating circumstance in
this part of its analysis, the liability function truly is the critical fac-
tor.3 29 The method of adjudicating the aggravating circumstances in
the Arizona statute does violate Adamson's sixth amendment right to
a jury trial, but not because they are elements of a new offense of
capital murder. The Arizona method violates the sixth amendment
because these aggravating circumstances are liability rules that must
be triable by a jury. 330 In other words, the Adamson court reaches the
correct result for the wrong reason. The court's analysis is faulty
325. See supra text accompanying notes 275-78.
326. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(f) (West 1988).
327. A similar sentencing factor appears in the Florida statute: "The capital felony was a
homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any
pretense of moral or legal justification." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(i) (1989).
328. The Adamson court's partial reliance on the Oregon Supreme Court's opinion in State
v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 623 P.2d 630 (1981), is flawed for the reason set forth in the discussion
of that case. See supra text accompanying notes 220-56. For a discussion of the critical
difference between the California aggravating circumstance as a sentencing factor, and the
Arizona aggravating circumstance as a"crime" under liability-rule analysis, see infra note 456
and accompanying text.
329. See infra text accompanying notes 332-36.
330. See infra text accompanying notes 431-33.
[Vol. 44:643
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
because it employs element analysis to define the distinction between
the right to a jury trial and the Spaziano-Hildwin rule that factually
based sentencing factors may be determined by the court alone. In
this respect, the Adamson court's analysis is subject to the same criti-
cism as is the second prong of the test suggested by the Amici in
Walton. Although in different terms, the second prong of the Amici's
test suggests that a liability rule is an element of a new offense created
by the Arizona capital sentencing scheme. The Adamson court uses
its analysis of the liability function of the Arizona aggravating cir-
cumstance to achieve precisely the same result. 3 1'
D. A Summary of the Element Analysis Critique
Traditional element analysis cannot distinguish between the "ele-
ments" of a crime and the components of a sentencing factor because
it was never designed to perform that type of policing function. The
three attempts to alter traditional element analysis to perform that
function (Quinn, Amici in Walton, and Adamson), have not been suc-
cessful. But both the Amici in Walton and the Adamson court
included a variant of liability rule analysis as a component of their
definition of the elements of a crime. For all of the reasons discussed
above, however, liability rule analysis should not be used to identify
"elements" of a crime. Element analysis should be abandoned as a
test for the attachment of the sixth amendment guarantee. As we
shall see in the following discussion, liability rule analysis promises a
simple solution to this problem. The evidence also suggests that the
framers of the Constitution probably intended liability analysis to set
the boundaries of the sixth amendment right to trial by jury.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING OF "CRIME," MODERN
CRIMINAL LAW, AND THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
A. The Fundamental Meaning of "Crime" and Its Modern
Variants
The two jury trial provisions in the Constitution are complemen-
tary:332 A "criminal prosecution" 333 is the trial of a "crime. '334 The
Constitution, of course, contains no definition of "crime"; and the
331. See supra text accompanying notes 279-80; infra text accompanying notes 332-66.
332. E.g., Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888) (Harlan, J., for a unanimous Court);
see supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
333. The sixth amendment states that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... U.S. CONST. amend VI.
334. Article III, § 2, cl. 3 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except
in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury ...." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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evolution of the wording of the Article III jury trial provision in the
Federal Convention provides no evidence that the framers had a pecu-
liar understanding of that term. The draft prepared by the Commit-
tee on Detail provided that "[t]he trial of all criminal offences (except
in cases of impeachments) shall be in the state where they shall be
committed, and shall be by jury. ' 335 On August 28, 1787, this provi-
sion was amended to provide that "[t]he trial of all crimes (except in
cases of impeachment) shall be by jury. .. 336 A stylistic change
appeared in the draft prepared by the Committee on Style reported on
September 12, 1787; "[t]he trial of all crimes, except in cases of
impeachment, shall be by jury .... 33 7 An amendment guaranteeing
a jury trial in civil cases was proposed and defeated on September 15,
1787, and later that day the Constitution was adopted. 338 There is no
evidence that the meaning of the word "crime" was ever debated in
the Convention or in the proceedings leading up to the ratification of
the Constitution.
The inference is compelling that the framers had such a clear
conception of "crime" in mind that the word needed neither debate
nor definition. We can be certain that their concept of crime was
based on the common law. Colonial criminal law was (at least in
Pennsylvania at the time of the Convention) the criminal law of Eng-
land.339 Moreover, the first penal statute enacted by Congress did not
define the crimes prohibited by the act. 3" Instead, Congress relied on
the traditional understanding of the common law crimes set forth in
the act. Thus, murder and manslaughter were made punishable by
the statute, but the definition of those felonies was left to the common
law. 4 ' The penal statutes enacted in the states after the revolution
335. 1 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 229
(1888); 5 J. ELLIOT, supra, at 381; 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
187 (1911). The notes from the records of the Committee On Detail show that one version
used the phrase "criml. offences," 2 M. FARRAND, supra at 144, and the notes for what
appears to be a later version uses the phrase "Crimes shall be tried ... " Id. at 173. On the
other hand, the draft reported by the Committee uses "Criminal offences .... " Id. at 187.
336. 1 J. ELLIOT, supra note 335, at 270; 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 335, at 438, 576.
337. 1 J. ELLIOT, supra note 335, at 304; 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 335, at 601.
338. 1 J. ELLIOT, supra note 335, at 317.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 21-31.
340. Punishment of Crimes Act, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790).
341. Id. §§ 3 & 7. For example, Sections 3 and 7 of the act reads, in pertinent part, as
follows:
And be it [further] enacted, That if any person or persons shall ... commit
the crime of wilful murder, such person or persons on being thereof convicted
shall suffer death. ...
And be it [further] enacted, That if any person or persons shall ... commit
the crime of manslaughter, and shall be thereof convicted, such person or persons
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were likewise based on the common law of England.34 2 Finally, the
Supreme Court has consistently looked to the common law to inter-
pret the meaning of the jury trial provisions.34 3 This practice has been
succinctly described by Justice Story:
[I]t can hardly be doubted, that the constitution and laws of the
United States are predicated upon the existence of the common
law. This has not, as I recollect, been denied by any'person, who
has maturely weighed the subject, and will abundantly appear on
the slightest examination. The constitution of the United States,
for instance, provides that "the trial of all crimes, except in cases of
impeachment, shall be by jury." I suppose that no person can
doubt, that for the explanation of these terms, and for the mode of
conducting trials by jury, recourse must be had to the common
law.
... In criminal cases, the right of trial by jury is preserved, but
the proceedings are not specifically regulated. The ... definition
and extent of the crime ... are left unprovided for. Upon what
ground then do the courts apply in such cases the rules of the com-
mon law? I can perceive no correct ground, unless it be, that the
legislature have constantly had in view the rules of the common
law, and deemed their application in casibus omissis peremptory
upon the courts.
As we have seen, at one point in the history of the common law,
there was a single homicide offense punished by a mandatory sentence
of death. Then, by a series of ancient statutes that withdrew benefit of
clergy,345 the basic crime was divided into a greater and lesser offense:
shall be imprisoned not exceeding three years, and fined not exceeding one
thousand dollars.
Id. §§ 3 & 7.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38.
343. E.g., Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, Nev., 109 S. Ct. 1289, 1291-92 (1989);
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). This
does not mean, of course, that the Court has always adopted the common law construction
once it has looked at the common law. See, e.g., Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506
(1974) (sixth amendment right to jury trial applies to post-verdict criminal contempt
proceedings if the sentences aggregate more than six months); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194
(1968) (sixth amendment right to trial by jury attaches to the trial of serious criminal
contempts despite the fact that no jury was required at common law-seriousness is
determined by the sentence actually imposed in absence of legislative specification of the
penalty); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (six person juries must be unanimous);
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) twelve person juries need not be unanimous);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding Florida statute providing for six-member
juries in all but capital cases).
344. United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 621 (1813) (No. 14,857), rev'd. on other
grounds, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 415 (1816).
345. These statutes are ancient enough to be considered part of the common law of
England.
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murder and manslaughter.346 Since both colonial criminal law and
American criminal law distinguished between murder and man-
slaughter in accordance with the common law, the framers. undoubt-
edly understood that these two crimes were greater and lesser offenses
created from what was once a single crime. For those not learned in
the common law of crimes, the slightest curiosity would have led
them to Blackstone, who tells the story at some length.347 It is also
reasonable to infer that the framers knew of the division of murder
into a capital and noncapital crime in William Penn's penal code and
of the Pennsylvania colony's struggle to maintain its own criminal
laws.348 Since reform of the criminal law in Pennsylvania began the
year before the Federal Convention, it is also reasonable to infer that
these events were known to the framers as well.349
The framers thus undoubtedly understood that "crimes" perform
two basic functions. First, a crime creates liability for punishment
when no liability existed before the law was enacted (as when a law
makes unlawful that which was lawful before). This is the basic con-
cept of a crime. Second, an existing crime can be divided into a
greater and lesser offense, for the purpose of limiting the punishment
prescribed for the existing offense to the new "greater" offense.
Indeed, this is the history of capital crimes at common law. The orig-
inal homicide offense was divided into murder and manslaughter, for
the purpose of limiting capital punishment to the greater offense of
murder. William Penn's Code further divided the crime of murder
into a capital and noncapital crime for precisely the same reason.
This history undoubtedly taught the framers, as it teaches us
now, that definitions of "crime" change, and that legislatures must be
fettered only by fundamental conceptions as new formulas are sought
to protect the people from the tyranny of crime. Emerging from this
history and from the framers' purpose to restrain government oppres-
sion by the guarantee of the right to trial by jury is the fundamental
346. See supra text accompanying note 11.
347. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The debate in the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention demonstrates that Blackstone's Commentaries were a source of authority in the
Pennsylvania convention. James Wilson was a lawyer, a delegate to the Federal Convention,
and a delegate to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention. In a debate between James Wilson
and another delegate, which took place on the floor of the Pennsylvania convention,
Blackstone's Commentaries was read as precedent for the point under discussion. See I J.
MCMASTER & F. STONE, PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-1788
360-61 (1888). Wilson was later appointed as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court by
President Washington in 1789. He was widely reputed to be "a profound thinker, and
thoroughly learned in the law." 2 J. MCMASTER & F. STONE, supra, at 758.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 25-38.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
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conception of crime: A "crime" is a factually based legal rule (or
series of legal rules) that either creates liability for punishment when
none existed before, or creates liability for enhanced punishment. In
other words, a "crime" identifies a package of factually based legal
rules that make punishment or enhanced punishment possible, if the
requisite facts are found to be true. The rules set forth the necessary
(or essential) precondition that must be found to exist before punish-
ment can be imposed on the accused. That is what is meant for a
legal rule to create liability by defining a "crime." Prosecutions for
crime thus are meant to create liability for punishment and to legiti-
mate the imposition of punishment on the offender for the crime com-
mitted. The law of capital murder illustrates the possible use of the
ultimate form of government oppression, "unfounded criminal
charges brought to eliminate enemies."350 Since government alone
wields this awesome power, the framers sought to prevent this form of
oppression by interposing "the common-sense judgment of a jury"
between government and the people.35" '
The framers thus undoubtedly believed that it was the legislative
body's task to fashion the definition of the various crimes as it saw fit.
Facts function under this conception of crime in any way they are
told by the legislative body. The Constitution imposes constraints
only on the liability function of the facts (or rules) that the legislature
selects to define a crime. If the legislature defines the facts or rules so
that they create liability for punishment, or liability for enhanced
punishment, then the right to a jury attaches to the process of estab-
lishing their existence. This must be true regardless of the name given
to that process, regardless of whether we call it a "trial," a "guilt
phase," a "penalty phase," or a "sentencing hearing," for government
can oppress with apparently legitimate punishment only those whom
it first makes liable for punishment.
35 2
Of course, the liability created must be for "punishment" before
350. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
351. Id. at 156.
352. But even if we reject the presumed intention of the framers as the basis for interpreting
the jury trial guarantee, the fundamental. conception of "crime" remains unchanged. It is
derived from our common law heritage, and it means neither more nor less than a-set of facts
or rules that create liability for punishment. It can mean no less for otherwise the
constitutional guarantee of the right to trial by jury cannot protect the People from
government oppression. Our conception of crime cannot be severed from the constitutional
guarantee that restrains its abuse. It can mean no more for otherwise legislatures would be
unduly restrained in defining new crimes for new situations. Constitutional guarantees must
be vigilantly and vigorously enforced, but they should not be extended beyond the point at
which they cease to further the constitutional guarantee and intrude on the constitution's
allocation of law-making power to the legislative branches of government. The relevant
precedent confirms this view. See infra text beginning at note 395.
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the sixth amendment is applicable.3"3 Arguably, the punitive nature
of the sanction imposed as a result of the proof of the requisite liabil-
ity rules may present a difficult question in a marginal case,354 but
that is surely not an issue when the rules create liability for the death
penalty.
Under this analysis, the dividing line between the sixth amend-
ment right to a jury trial and the Spaziano-Hildwin rule (that factually
based sentencing factors may be determined by the court at a sentenc-
ing hearing) depends upon the function performed by the particular
feature and its relation to the purposes of the jury trial. The sixth
amendment right to a jury trial attaches to the liability functions of a
given rule, but not to its sentencing functions. Thus, when a legisla-
tive bodydefines a particular feature so that it functions both to create
liability for punishment (or liability for enhanced punishment) and to
assess the appropriate punishment, the determination of the existence
or nonexistence of that feature for liability purposes must be triable by
a jury, but the sentencing function of the rule may be assigned to the
court at a sentencing hearing in which the jury does not participate.
In other words, the terms "crimes" and "criminal prosecutions" in
the two constitutional provisions mean nothing more and nothing less
than "rules creating liability for punishment" and "proceedings to
determine the existence of rules creating liability for punishment. ' 355
The analysis does not differ if the particular feature has only a
single function. If it functions to impose liability for punishment,
then the right to jury trial attaches to that particular feature. Its
existence or nonexistence must be determinable by a jury. On the
other hand, if the particular feature functions only as a sentencing
factor, then the trial court may determine its existence or nonexis-
tence at the sentencing stage of the capital proceedings. This is true
even if the particular feature is factually based.
The alternative formulation of the capital sentencing procedure
of the Model Penal Code provides a concrete example for analysis.
We begin by analyzing the functions of the aggravating
circumstances:
The determination whether sentence of death shall be imposed
shall be in the discretion of the Court....
The Court, in exercising its discretion as to sentence, and the
353. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (sixth amendment right to jury
trial not applicable to the adjudication of liability rules in state juvenile court proceedings).
354. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 163-70 (1963) (holding two
acts of Congress invalid because Congress employed the sanction of deprivation of nationality
as punishment without providing the protections afforded by the fifth and sixth amendments).
355. See supra text accompanying notes 332-52.
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jury, in determining upon its verdict, shall take into account the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances enumerated in Subsec-
tions (3) and (4) and any other facts that it deems relevant, but
shall not impose or recommend sentence of death unless it finds one
of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsection (3) and
further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently
substantial to call for leniency.35 6
Since a sentence of death is possible if, but only if, one of the
enumerated aggravating circumstances is found to exist, the aggravat-
ing circumstances function to create liability for the punishment of
death.357 In other words, proof of at least one aggravating circum-
stance is a necessary condition for the imposition of the enhanced
punishment of death. If no aggravating circumstance is found to
exist, then no death sentence is possible. This means, of course, that
the enumerated aggravating circumstances function as factually based
liability rules. It also means that aggravating circumstances are
"crimes" within the meaning of the two constitutional provisions, and
that the proceedings to determine their existence or nonexistence are
"criminal prosecutions" within the meaning of the sixth amendment.
The sixth amendment right to a jury trial thus attaches to the deter-
mination of the existence or nonexistence of the aggravating circum-
stances, and since the "alternative formulation" does not permit jury
trial of this issue, the Model Penal Code provision (if it were enacted
into law) violates the sixth amendment guarantee.358
As seen above, this analysis applies even though the Model Penal
Code does not label aggravating circumstances "crimes," and even
though the Code provides for their litigation in a separate sentencing
hearing held by the court alone. 3 9 Even though the Model Penal
Code's aggravating circumstances function as sentencing factors, as
long as they also function to make enhanced punishment possible, a
jury must determine their xistence or nonexistence. A state is free to
use judicial sentencing under Spaziano, but it may not violate the
offender's sixth amendment right when it does so. The state may use
aggravating circumstances as factually based sentencing factors under
Hildwin, but the aggravating circumstances may not also function to
create liability for a sentence of death.36
356. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 210.6(2) (1980) (alternative formulation of Subsection (2))
(emphasis added).
357. See id. comment 5, at 135-36; supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
358. This discussion assumes that a violation of the sixth amendment guarantee is per se
invalid. For a discussion of this question, see infra text accompanying notes 367-98.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 59-69
360. For a discussion of how this may be done, see infra text accompanying notes 385-89.
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A sentencing factor thus does not concern liability for punish-
ment in general, or liability for an enhanced punishment, or liability
for a range of possible punishments. A sentencing factor concerns the
selection of the punishment from a prescribed range after liability for
that range of punishment is established. In the context of a capital
sentencing procedure, a sentencing factor aids in the selection of the
appropriate sentence between two alternatives: death or some form of
imprisonment. Sentencing factors (or sentencing rules) thus operate
in the sentencing realm after the defendant is admitted to that realm
by the appropriate liability rules. They are exclusively concerned
with the question of the choice of punishment for which the defendant
previously has been found liable. Sentencing factors (or rules) have
no role to play in the question of whether the defendant shall be pun-
ished, and they have no role to play in selecting the range of possible
punishments. Those functions are the exclusive province of the liabil-
ity rules.
At this point we should distinguish liability rule analysis from a
similar component of element analysis used by both the Adamson
court3 6 ' and the Amici in Walton.362 Both the Adamson court and the
Amici in Walton rely on the fact that the "elements" of a crime are
used to create liability for punishment.363 Under their versions of ele-
ment analysis, the presence of a liability creating function indicates
that the particular factor is an element of the crime. Since (according
to this theory) the sixth amendment attaches to the elements of a
crime, the right to a jury trial attaches to the determination of the
existence or nonexistence of that factor. Liability rule analysis, on the
other hand, does not identify the elements of the crime. Rather, lia-
bility analysis directly defines the meaning of "crime" in the two jury
trial provisions in the Constitution. Although element analysis might
possibly be altered to reach the same result,3 64 as we have seen, ele-
361. See supra text accompanying notes 279-80.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 253-56.
363. Element analysis thus puts the cart before the horse. The elements of a crime
collectively function to create liability for punishment (original or enhanced), but the elements
of a crime are simply a description of the legislative body's definition of the crime.
364. Assuming that the second prong of the Amici's test is meant to describe a liability rule,
see supra text accompanying note 253, then the Amici's proposed test would reach the same
result as the liability-rule analysis if the following chanages were made:
(1) The first prong of Amici's suggested test should be abandoned for the reasons
discussed above. See supra text beginning at note 232.
(2) The second prong should be abandoned as a test for identifying the elements of a
crime. Instead, it should be used to draw the line between the right to a jury trial and the
Spaziano-Hildwin rule. In other words, it should be used to define "crime" in the
Constitution's two jury trial provisions.
(3) The implication that the second prong is only applicable to "a greater offense" (or
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ment analysis should not be used to determine whether the existence
or nonexistence of a particular factor is triable by a jury under the
sixth amendment.365
The framers of the Constitution would probably marvel at the
way the Model Penal Code and most modern statutes define eligibility
for the death penalty. But their conception of crime embodied in the
two jury trial provisions of the Constitution is as adequate today to
protect the right to a jury trial as it was when the Constitution was
adopted. The framers would be surprised by the details of these new
crimes, but they would have no difficulty deciding what issues must be
tried by a jury under the sixth amendment.366
B. A Weighing of Interests Analysis Under Duncan
The right to a jury thus attaches to the determination of the
existence or nonexistence of the Model Penal Code's aggravating cir-
cumstances because they are "crimes" within the meaning of the sixth
amendment. They are "crimes" because they function to create liabil-
ity for enhanced punishment. If a violation of the sixth amendment
jury trial guarantee invokes a per se test of invalidity, then the Model
Penal Code's "alternative formulation" is unconstitutional. But the
Court's holding in Duncan, that the sixth amendment right to a jury
trial does not apply to "petty offenses," implies that a weighing of
interests test may be applicable to the sixth amendment:
So-called petty offenses were tried without juries both in Eng-
land and in the Colonies and have always been held to be exempt
from the otherwise comprehensive language of the Sixth Amend-
ment's jury trial provisions. There is no substantial evidence that
the Framers intended to depart from this established common-law
practice, and the possible consequences to defendants from convic-
tions for petty offenses have been thought insufficient to outweigh
enhanced sentencing") should be abandoned. See supra text accompanying notes 235-37.
The liability-rule analysis governs the attachment of the right to a jury trial for all crimes,
great or small, provided that the crime is not a petty offense.
(4) The qualification that the enhanced punishment must be "substantial" should be
abandoned. Facts that establish or create liability for any and all punishment must be triable
by a jury under the sixth amendment, provided that the crime is not a petty offense.
Of course, element analysis would be abandoned with these changes, and liability analysis
would be used to determine when the right to a jury trial attaches to any given factual issue in
a criminal case.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 331-32.
366. The framers would be surprised, of course, by: (1) the allocation of the determination
of the liability rules to the sentencing phase of a trial (for, as we have seen, this was an
unprecedented "innovation" of the Model Penal Code), (2) the architecture of the capital
proceeding, and (3) the details .of the concepts used to create liability. See supra text
accompanying notes 345-52.
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the benefits to efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial
administration resulting from the availability of speedy and inex-
pensive nonjury adjudications. a67
This passage can be read to suggest the possibility that the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial may be overridden, once it has
attached, if the defendant's interests in a jury determination of the
liability rules are outweighed by legitimate government interests-
interests not closely associated with the risk of government oppres-
sion. 368 The Court also has been reluctant to stifle all state experi-
mentation with new procedures that arguably encroach upon the-right
to a jury trial.3 69 Although each of these situations is clearly distin-
guishable from the problem at hand, a weighing of the respective
interests of the defendant and the state still confirms the conclusion
that the Model Penal Code's "alternative formulation" violates the
sixth amendment guarantee.370
The interests of the defendant in a jury trial of the liability rules
in a capital case are the same today as they were when the sixth
amendment guarantee was adopted. What then are the possible state
interests that might support the Model Penal Code's allocation of the
determination of the aggravating circumstances to the court at the
sentencing phase of the trial? Since the Model Penal Code pre-dated
Furman by ten years, we can explore this issue best from the perspec-
tive of a state wishing to enact the "alternative formulation" proposed
367. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968).
368. See also Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974) (sixth amendment right to jury
trial applies to post-verdict criminal contempt proceedings if the sentences aggregate to more
than six months); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (sixth amendment right to trial by
jury attaches to the trial of serious criminal contempts despite the fact that no jury was
required at common law-seriousness is determined by the sentence actually imposed in the
absence of legislative specification of the penalty).
369. See Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976) (Massachusetts' two-tier trial
system does not unduly burden the right to a jury trial although the Massachusetts' system
makes a jury trial available only after a conviction in a first-tier trial in which a jury is not
available because the right to trial by jury is guaranteed in a second-tier trial.).
370. The "petty offense" exception to the right to trial by jury was justified by the settled
usage of the common law and by the presumed intention of the framers of the sixth
amendment. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 109 S. Ct. 1289 (1989), Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 144 (1968), thus support the
conclusion that the right to a jury trial attaches to the litigation of liability rules that create
liability for a death penalty without engaging in a balancing of interests analysis. The cases
that define the constitutionally required jury, though they apparently depart from the common
law jury as it existed when the sixth amendment was drafted, all preserve the right to a jury
trial of the liability rules in a manner that the Court found to be consistent with the purpose of
the sixth amendment guarantee. See, e.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134-37 (1979);
Apodaca v. Oregon. 406 U.S. 404, 410-12 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 98-103
(1970).
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by the Model Code.37'
I have been able to discover five possible state goals. First, some
state officials believed that the Court's holding in Furman prohibited
jury sentencing in capital cases.372 Under this view, the litigation of
the aggravating circumstances must be allocated to the trial court at a
separate sentencing hearing in order to satisfy the requirements of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause as the Furman Court inter-
preted it. This interest deserves little weight, for it misconstrues
Furman's holding. In Spaziano, the Court observed that
"[s]entencing by the trial judge certainly is not required by Furman v.
Georgia."373
The second possible reason for allocating the litigation of the
existence or nonexistence of the necessary aggravating circumstances
to the trial court at the sentencing hearing is that the Model Penal
Code's capital sentencing procedure provided a persuasive example
for doing so. 374 In other words, the provision might be adopted sim-
ply because of the Model Penal Code's extraordinary influence on
contemporary criminal law. Since the American Law Institute saw
nothing wrong with the procedure, it provided an "alternative formu-
lation" to be used as a model to accomplish judicial sentencing in
capital cases. There is no substantial interest, of course, in simply
copying a "model" procedure. The weight of the state interest must
be determined by assessing the model's rationale for this allocation.
Since the Model penal Code's purpose was to create a "final judgment
[on the sentence to be imposed] based upon a balancing of aggrava-
tions and of mitigations, ' 375 and since this interest could be used inde-
pendently of the Model Code as a reason for this allocation, the
weight of that interest receives consideration immediately below. But
before we turn to that interest, we should remember that the Model
Penal Code was promulgated before the Court decided Duncan.376
Thus, the Code's authors did not draft the "alternative formulation"
with the sixth amendment in mind.
The third possible reason for litigating -aggravating circum-
stances at the sentencing hearing is to create a symmetrical procedure
371. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58.
372. See infra note 373; see also NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., SUMMARY OF
PROCEEDINGS 1973, at 23-25 (1973) (remarks of Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of the
State of Florida).
373. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 463 n.8 (1984); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
188-95 (1976).
374. See supra text accompanying notes 53-74.
375. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 comment 5, at 135 (1980); see supra text accompanying
notes 65-68.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
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whereby the existence or nonexistence of both the aggravating cir-
cumstances and the mitigating circumstances are determined at the
same time in the same proceeding. The purpose of contemporaneous
adjudication of the existence of both aggravation and mitigation is to
avoid according disproportionate significance to the aggravating cir-
cumstances. This might occur if the aggravating circumstances were
determined to exist at an earlier stage of the trial.37 7 The commentary
to the Model Penal Code gives precisely this reason for its
recommendation.378
When a jury determines the existence of aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances for both liability and sentencing (as in the great
majority of the states that employ the capital sanction), there is no
adverse impact on the constitutional right to trial by jury when this
symmetrical allocation is made.3 79 Both the defendant's interest in a
jury trial and this interest can be easily implemented. When the trial
court is the sentencing authority, however, the state can implement
the symmetrical allocation only by abridging the defendant's right to
a jury trial. There is no sensible reason to pursue a mechanical policy
in favor of symmetry when the judge decides the sentence. The state's
interest in avoiding the inflation of the significance of the aggravating
circumstances may have considerable weight when the sentencing
authority is the jury.380 But when trial judges are the sentencing
authorities, we expect them to be able to follow the law and to accord
no exaggerated significance to a jury finding of the existence of one or
more aggravating circumstances. Indeed, trial judges are routinely
presented with this very task whenever defendants are sentenced in
noncapital criminal cases in which aggravating circumstances are
built into the definition of the crime: first, the jury finds the defendant
guilty of the aggravated offense, and then mitigation is presented to
the court at the sentencing hearing. We rely on judges not to accord
inflated weight to the offense found by the jury and to weigh fairly the
mitigation found to exist in the sentencing hearing against the aggra-
vated offense found by the jury. There is no reason to suspect that
judges are incapable of making the same balanced judgment in a capi-
377. See id.
378. See id.
379. See supra text accompanying notes 354-55.
380. The apprehension that a jury will inflate the significance of an aggravating
circumstance found in the guilt phase of a trial rests on the assumption that deciding all of the
aggravating facts before any mitigating facts are determined may prejudice the jury in favor of
a death sentence. Of course, this may or may not be true. When the jury is the sentencing
authority, however, nothing appears to be lost by litigating both the liability function and the
sentencing function of the aggravating circumstances in the sentencing phase of the capital
trial.
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tal case. Indeed, it would be ludicrous to deny the defendant the right
to a jury trial on the ground that by doing so, the state is protecting
the defendant from the possibility of the court according questionable
significance to the jury's prior finding that one or more aggravating
circumstances exist in the case.
The interest in avoiding inflation of the aggravating circum-
stances in the sentencing process thus deserves little weight, surely not
enough weight to override the defendant's interest in a jury trial. We
can rely upon juries to determine the liability function of the aggra-
vating circumstances and upon judges to use the aggravating circum-
stances found by the jury as sentencing factors when striking the vital
balance between aggravation and mitigation during the sentencing
phase of the trial.38 '
The fourth possible state interest is administrative convenience.
The question of the existence of aggravating circumstances will arise
only after there is a finding of guilt of an offense which can be aggra-
vated. In the Model Penal Code's classification scheme, an aggravat-
ing circumstance can only attach to a finding of guilt of the crime of
murder.382 If the jury convicts of a nonqualifying homicide offense,383
then there is no need to litigate the issue of the existence of aggravat-
ing circumstances. Allocating the litigation of the existence of the
aggravating circumstances to the sentencing phase of the trial thus
would save time and money whenever the defendant is found guilty of
a nonqualifying homicide offense. On the other hand, the Model
Penal Code's allocation promotes the expenditure of time and money
whenever there is a finding of guilt of a qualifying offense and a later
finding in the sentencing hearing that no aggravating circumstances
exist. If the question of the existence or nonexistence of the aggravat-
ing circumstances were litigated in the guilt phase, a sentencing phase
of the trial would not have been necessary in this situation. Whether
the allocation of the adjudication of the existence of aggravating cir-
cumstances to the sentencing phase of the trial actually promotes
381. The Model Penal Code's basic provision was probably crafted on the assumption that
the jury would participate in the sentencing process. Since the Model Penal Code took no
position on the identity of the sentencing authority in a capital case, but instead attempted to
draft a provision suitable for use when either the jury or the trial judge acts as the sentencing
authority, this provision was probably inadvertently included in the alternative draft designed
to adopt court sentencing in capital cases. See supra text accompanying notes 59-74. The
Model Penal Code's "alternative formulation" thus appears to have been produced without
sufficient thought to this problem.
382. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(1) (1980).
383. For example, manslaughter rather than murder in a state that follows the Model Penal
Code's scheme, and murder in the second degree rather than murder in the first degree in
Arizona and other states with similar laws.
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administrative efficiency thus is highly debatable. In any event,
whatever weight we assign to a speculative assertion of administrative
efficiency clearly must be insufficient to justify denying a defendant's
constitutional right to a jury trial.38 4
The last possible state interest is the most important: the adop-
tion of judicial sentencing in capital cases. Although most of the
states that currently employ the death penalty provide for jury partic-
ipation in the capital sentencing process,38 5 there is a significant body
of opinion supporting court sentencing in capital cases. 86 The view is
grounded on the belief that judicial sentencing would "lead, if any-
thing, to even greater consistency in the imposition at the trial court
level of capital punishment, since a trial judge is more experienced in
sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to impose
sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases. ' 387 As impor-
tant as this interest may be, it is not furthered by allocating the deter-
mination of the liability function of the aggravating circumstances to
the court at the sentencing phase of the capital trial.388 Judicial sen-
tencing in capital cases does not require judicial determination of lia-
bility. Judicial sentencing can be implemented if the law divides the
two functions of the aggravating circumstances, the liability function
and the sentencing function, and allocates only the sentencing func-
tion of the aggravating circumstances to the sentencing stage of the
trial. There the court alone would determine the appropriate sentence
by balancing the aggravating circumstances found to exist by the jury
at the guilt phase (the liability phase) against the mitigating circum-
stances found by the court at the sentencing hearing. The trial court
does not need to determine the existence of aggravating circumstances
as a rule creating liability in order to determine the proper sentence,
just as the trial court does not need to make the finding of guilt of the
384. See supra notes 368-69.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
386. Neither the Model Penal Code nor the American Bar Association's Standards for
Criminal Justice took a position on whether capital punishment should be utilized or, whether
a jury should participate in the capital sentencing process if capital punishment is utilized. See
supra text accompanying notes 60-61. Similarly, the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Standards and Goals took no position on whether capital punishment should be an
available sanction. See National Advisory Commission On Criminal Standards And Goals,
Corrections, Standard 5.2, commentary at 152-53 (1973) (Hereinafter NAC Corrections); id.
Standard 16.7 commentary at 568, the standards favor court sentencing in all situations (See
NAC Corrections, Standard 16.8(1): "All sentences should be determined by the court rather
than by a jury." Accord NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL STANDARDS AND
GOALS, COURTS STANDARD 5.1 (1973): "Jury sentencing should be abolished in all situations.
.. This presumably includes capital sentencing.
387. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976).
388. See supra text accompanying notes 379-81.
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qualifying homicide offense. These are necessary findings, but a jury
can make them without substantially interfering with the accuracy or
fairness of the process of judicial sentencing. Indeed, as we have seen
before in the discussion of the third possible interest, this type of sen-
tencing procedure is routinely found in cases in which the aggravating
circumstances form part of the definition of an aggravated offense.
By allocating the determination of the liability function of aggra-
vating circumstances to the jury at the guilt phase of the trial, and the
sentencing function of aggravating circumstances to the court at the
sentencing phase of the trial, the state can fully guarantee the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to a jury trial and fully achieve its goals
of consistency and fairness in capital sentencing. Given the state's
ability fully to achieve both of these goals by the simple process of
allocating the liability function to the jury and the sentencing function
to the trial court, the state's interest in allocating both of these func-
tions to the trial court is entitled to little weight.
Since the state's interest in allocating the determination of both
functions to the trial court at the sentencing hearing is so minimal, I
suspect that it was thoughtlessly done-that it was nothing more than
a transfer of the regular provisions (which were designed with jury
participation in sentencing in mind) into the Code's "alternative for-
mulation," without adequate reflection.3 9 Regardless of the reason
for adopting this allocation scheme, however, the state's interest in
adopting judicial sentencing is so minimally furthered by allocating
the determination of the liability function of the aggravating circum-
stances to the court at the sentencing hearing, and so completely
destructive of the defendant's jury trial right, that the constitutional
right should triumph under any interest balancing test.
Because the Court has never held that a state's interest was suffi-
cient to override a defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury trial in
a serious criminal case, the Court has not yet identified overtly a stan-
dard of review as appropriate for deciding whether a state's interest
can override the defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury trial.
Nevertheless, in view of the Court's determination that the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial "is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice, ' 390 the sixth amendment right undoubtedly
deserves some form of heightened scrutiny. The Court's sixth amend-
ment jurisprudence has used a per se test of invalidity when a state
abridges the right to trial by jury in a serious criminal case, although
the Court has not specifically stated that it employed this standard of
389. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
390. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
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review in doing SO. 39 1 Under that per se standard, once the Court
determines that the right to a jury trial has been abridged, the Court
holds the state's abridging action unconstitutional without balancing
the interests of the state and the defendant. Under the per se stan-
dard, since the jury trial right attaches to the determination of the
liability function of the aggravating circumstances, the allocation of
this determination to the court at the sentencing hearing violates the
sixth amendment right to trial by jury and is thus unconstitutional.
Not infrequently, however, the Court has protected fundamental
constitutional rights by balancing the respective interests of the par-
ties. When a right is found to be a "fundamental constitutional
right," the Court has strictly scrutinized the state action that abridges
the fundamental constitutional right in question.392 Under the strict
scrutiny standard, the constitutional right prevails unless the state
demonstrates that its interest is "compelling. ' 393 Furthermore, the
state must show that its action is necessary to further that compelling
interest.3 94  The presence of a less restrictive alternative that will
equally further the state's goal demonstrates that the state's action is
not necessary to further its interest.3 95 If the strict scrutiny standard
of review is applicable to the jury trial right, then the sixth amend-
ment right must prevail. For the reason indicated above, the state's
interest falls far short of being sufficiently weighty to be called "com-
pelling," and there exists a less restrictive alternative that equally
serves the state's goal of judicial sentencing in capital cases.
Indeed, in Bloom v. Illinois396 the Court may have applied the
strict scrutiny form of an interest balancing test to decide that the
interests asserted by the state in punishing contempt of court without
the interference of a jury were not sufficiently compelling to override
the defendant's sixth amendment right. After deciding that criminal
contempt is a "crime" within the meaning of the sixth amendment
(which it surely is), the Court scrutinized the interests the state
offered to justify dispensing with the jury trial right and concluded,
"[n]or are there compelling reasons for a contrary result.
397
But it is not necessary to determine the exact standard of review
391, See supra note 343.
392. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-38 (1969) (equal protection clause
issue-strict scrutiny analysis applied to the abridgment of a constitutional right); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-1, at 770, § 16-6 (2d ed. 1988).
393. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634-38.
394. See, e.g., id.; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.4, at
351-52 (3d ed. 1986).
395. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 634-38.
396. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
397. Id. at 208.
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appropriate for the protection of the sixth amendment right to a jury
trial. Under any standard of review that meaningfully protects the
sixth amendment guarantee, the right to a jury trial should prevail.
None of the examined interests that might support allocating the
determination of the liability function to the trial judge at the sentenc-
ing hearing are sufficiently substantial to outweigh the defendant's
sixth amendment right. Moreover, there is a readily available alterna-
tive method to advance the state's goal of judicial sentencing.3 98 That
goal is obtainable by allocating the sentencing function of the aggra-
vating circumstances to the court at the sentencing hearing and by
allocating the determination of the liability function to the trier of fact
at the guilt phase of the trial. If the two functions of the aggravating
circumstances are allocated in this way, the defendant's right to a jury
trial is fully preserved and the state's goal of judicial sentencing is
fulfilled.
C. Supreme Court Precedent
There is no real tension between the-rules established by Duncan
and Spaziano. The sixth amendment's purpose of preventing govern-
ment oppression is completely fulfilled when the jury returns its ver-
dict on the "crimes" charged. Nevertheless, a constitutional line must
be drawn between the right to a jury trial and the Spaziano-Hildwin
rule. State v. Quinn, Adamson v. Ricketts, and McMillan v. Penn-
sylvania all recognize the need for drawing this constitutional line.
The common fault of Quinn and Adamson is not in recognizing that a
constitutional line had to be drawn, but rather in how those cases
drew the line. Both cases used the "elements" of crime as the bound-
ary between the jury trial right and the Spaziano-Hildwin rule, but
neither effort was successful.39 9 Under the analysis used in Quinn and
Adamson, a "crime" for the purposes of the sixth amendment is
defined as any particular feature of state law that has the requisite
"elements" of a crime. On the other hand, the liability-rule analysis
defined "crime" for the purposes of the sixth amendment as any par-
ticular feature of state law that functions to create liability for punish-
ment, regardless of whether it creates liability for punishment when
none existed before, or whether it creates liability for greater punish-
ment. The inferred intention of the framers of the Constitution sup-
ports this analysis.
398. The presence of this less restrictive alternative both undermines the weight of the
state's interest and provides an independent basis for invalidating the state's abridgment of the
sixth amendment right.
399. See supra text accompanying notes 223-32 & 257-62.
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The Supreme Court has never been presented with a claim that
required the Court to select between these two competing methods for
defining "crime" for the purposes of the two jury trial provisions in
the Constitution. The question explored here is whether either analy-
sis is more consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent.
There is no reason to repeat the full analysis of Duncan v. Louisi-
ana and Spaziano v. Florida set forth above."° Duncan confirmed the
purpose of the jury trial guarantee and interpreted the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to embrace the sixth amend-
ment's right to trial by jury. Duncan, however, did not plumb the
meaning of "crime" or "criminal prosecution," for Gary Duncan's
conduct and the resulting prosecution fit all conceivable definitions of
those terms. The only definitional issue raised in Duncan was
whether the crime was a "petty" offense and thus outside the scope of
the jury trial guarantee." ° On the other hand, Spaziano held that the
sixth amendment guarantee does not extend to the determination of
the appropriate punishment to be imposed on the defendant. °2 The
Spaziano rule was revisited by the Court in Hildwin v. Florida.4 °"
Hildwin made explicit what was implicit in Spaziano: The right to a
jury trial does not extend to the determination of factually based sen-
tencing factors.' 4 Rather, under the sixth amendment, the trial judge
may make the necessary factual findings that aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors exist, and the trial judge may then determine the sentence.
In other words, Spaziano established the principle that a jury is not
required to determine the sentence in a capital case; Hildwin made
clear that a jury determination was not required to determine the
existence of factually based sentencing factors. 4" Since no claim was
presented in either Spaziano or Hildwin that the aggravating circum-
stances in Florida's capital sentencing scheme are "crimes" masquer-
ading as sentencing factors, neither case explored the meaning of
"'crimes" or "criminal prosecutions" for sixth amendment
purposes." 6
400. See supra text accompanying notes 103-54.
401. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
402. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459-65 (1984).
403. 109 S. Ct. 2055 (1989).
404. Id. at 2057.
405. Id.
406. In Spaziano, the Court observed: Petitioner does not urge that capital sentencing is so
much like a trial on guilt or innocence that it is controlled by the Court's decision in Duncan v.
Louisiana." Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 458. In Hildwin, the "petitioner argued that the Florida
capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment because it permits the imposition of
death without a specific finding by the jury that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to
qualify the defendant for capital punishment." 109 S. Ct. at 2056. The Court rejected this
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At the outset, Quinn may be set aside, for that case concerned
the right to jury trial guaranteed by the Oregon Constitution. But
Adamson derived its element analysis from the Supreme Court's due
process jurisprudence,4°7 which began with In re Winship." In Win-
ship, the Court held "that the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged." 9 If Winship and its progeny require element analysis for
the purpose of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
then is element analysis required for the purpose of defining the bor-
der of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial? No. On the con-
trary, the reasonable doubt cases are easily distinguished. They
govern the allocation of the risk of nonpersuasion in what is always
conceded to be a criminal case. Neither the due process clause in
general nor the reasonable doubt standard in particular concern polic-
ing the boundaries between the substantive criminal law and some
other body of law, such as the law of sentencing. Thus, the Winship
doctrine operates only within the borders of the substantive criminal
law as defined by the legislative body.41 0 The element analysis
employed by the Winship doctrine thus seeks to distinguish the ele-
ments of the crime (which must be proved by the prosecution beyond
a reasonable doubt) from other components of the criminal law, such
as self-defense4' and the affirmative defense of extreme emotional dis-
turbance 12 (in which case a burden of proof may be allocated to the
defendant). The task of drawing the line that distinguishes the sub-
stantive criminal law from the law of sentencing is entirely different.
As we have seen, element analysis was not designed to perform this
border-defining function, and when attempts have been made to
employ element analysis for that purpose, they have been completely
unsuccessful. Consequently, the Court's Winship doctrine neither
compels nor counsels the use of element analysis for the task at hand.
Nevertheless, Hildwin mentions element analysis,4 13 and it forms
contention, because "the existence of an aggravating factor here is not an element of the offense
but instead is 'a sentencing factor that comes into play only after the defendant has been found
guilty.' " Id. at 2057 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)).
407. Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1024 (9th Cir. 1988).
408. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
409. Id. at 364.
410. E.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232 (1987); McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85; Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977).
411. Martin, 480 U.S. at 228.
412. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 197.
413. Hildwin v. Florida, 109 S. Ct. 2055, 2057 (1989).
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a major portion of the Court's discussion in McMillan.414 Since both
cases resolve sixth amendment jury trial claims, do Hildwin and
McMillan require element analysis to define the borderline between
the substantive criminal law and the law of sentencing? Again, the
answer is no. Hildwin's reference to the elements of a crime respond
to petitioner's McMillan argument.4 15 Thus, the argument that ele-
ment analysis must provide the line sought here depends entirely
upon McMillan. The petitioner's principal argument in McMillan
"was that visible possession of a firearm is an element of the crimes
for which they were being sentenced and thus must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt under In re Winship.' '416 The Court concluded,
however, that visible possession was not an element of the offense
under the Winship doctrine, but instead, a sentencing factor, which
was not governed by Winship's proof requirement.41 7 Petitioner's
argument of the sixth amendment issue in their brief was truncated.41 s
It focused on the fact that visible possession is a factual determination
that relates to the manner in which the crime was committed, and as
such, under the sixth amendment, the jury must make that determina-
tion.41 9 Petitioners did not mention Spaziano in their brief.42° Spazi-
ano and element analysis, on the other hand, were the focal points of
respondent's reply:
[Petitioners] argue that the jury must determine all ultimate facts
concerning the offense committed. As shown above, however, pos-
session of a firearm is not an element of the crimes enumerated in
the Act. It is not an ultimate fact about the crime, but instead a
fact relevant to sentencing. Therefore, the relevant inquiry is
whether the sixth amendment requires a sentencing jury.
It is clear that the sixth amendment carries no such require-
ment. There is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing
421
The McMillan Court accepted respondent's characterization of visible
possession as a sentencing factor, and rejected the petitioner's claim
under Spaziano.422
414. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 83, 93.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 83.
417. Id. at 84-91.
418. See Brief for Petitioners at 33-38, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (No.
85-215).
419. Id.
420. See id. at iii-vi.
421. Brief for Respondent at 12-13, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (No. 85-
215).
422. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93. For the text of the Court's single sentence rejection, see
supra text accompanying note 305.
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Given the brevity of the argument concerning the sixth amend-
ment issue, McMillan cannot be said to adopt element analysis as the
test for determining the attachment of the sixth amendment right to a
jury trial.423 More importantly, McMillan's discussion of the function
performed by the visible possession requirement lends some support
to liability analysis as the basis for determining when the sixth amend-
ment right to a jury trial attaches to a factual finding. However,
because these statements were made during the Court's discussion of
the Winship claim, they cannot be said to adopt that approach.
During the course of rejecting the Winship argument, Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the Court:
[The visible possession requirement] neither alters the maximum
penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate- offense call-
ing for a separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing
court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already
available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a
firearm .... Petitioners' claim that visible possession under the
Pennsylvania statute is "really" an element of the offenses for
which they are being punished-that Pennsylvania has in effect
defined a new set of upgraded felonies-would have at least more
superficial appeal if a finding of visible possession exposed them to
greater or additional punishment ... . but it does not.424
As I read this passage, it means that if visible possession func-
tions as a liability rule, then the petitioners' argument that it is an
element of the offense subject to Winship's requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt has more appeal, though it may be only
"superficial." The Court is reticent to use element analysis to "really"
find a crime when the legislature has not meant to define one. The
Court restates its distaste for this use of element analysis later in the
opinion. "Pennsylvania's decision," wrote Justice Rehnquist, "has
not transformed against its will a sentencing factor into an 'element'
of some hypothetical 'offense.' "425
Liability analysis, on the other hand, does not work in this way.
Under liability analysis, the Court does not "find" a new crime when
423. As noted above, once the Court determines that a particular feature is an element of
the crime, it is clear that the right to a jury trial attaches to the factual determination of that
element's existence. This right does not attach because the particular feature is an element of
the crime, but because all of the elements of a crime function as liability rules. Still, not all
liability rules are properly classified as elements of a crime. Thus, the fact that visible
possession is not an element of the crime should not be dispositive of the right to a jury trial.
However, since visible possession did not operate as a liability rule in the Pennsylvania Act,
the sixth amendment right did not attach. See infra text accompanying notes 426-30.
424. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88 (emphasis added).
425. Id. at 90.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
a legislature did not mean to create one. It does not transform any
feature of state law into a crime against the legislative will. It does
not require the Court to recognize some hypothetical offense.
Instead, the state legislature is held responsible for nothing more and
nothing less than what it does. The legislative body is free to define
crime in any way it sees fit. Facts operate in any way the legislative
body says they act. If the facts define a crime, so be it. If the facts
define some other feature of state law, then regardless of its name, the
sixth amendment right to a jury trial depends upon how that feature
actually functions. If it creates liability for punishment, then the right
to a jury trial attaches. But by assessing the actual function of the
feature created by the legislative body, the Court does not tell the
state that it has created a crime when it did not mean to do so. There
is a substantial difference between the message that the legislature
cannot create a rule that imposes liability for punishment without
providing for jury trial, and telling a state that it has "really" created
a crime that does not appear as such in the penal statutes.
Read correctly, the McMillan Court's statement about equating
liability rules with elements of the offense expresses the Court's dis-
taste for element analysis and its inevitable message that the legisla-
tive body has created a crime when none was intended. It may also
reflect the Court's intuitive distrust of equating liability rules with ele-
ments of an offense.42 6 Since this is not required whenliability rules
are used to determine when the right to a jury trial attaches, and since
McMillan recognizes the critical importance of liability rules, McMil-
lan appears to support liability analysis.
Before we move to a consideration of the final case, we should
note that the "visible possession" feature of the Pennsylvania Act at
issue in McMillan does not function as a liability rule. A finding of its
existence does not create any new or additional liability beyond that
fixed by the finding of guilt of the underlying offense. In other words,
McMillan was liable for the punishment mandated by the finding
before the visible possession finding was made. The visible possession
feature operated "solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in
selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the
special finding of visible possession of a firearm. '427 A necessary
corollary of McMillan's holding is that sentencing factors may func-
tion to control the sentencing authority's discretion. Indeed, some of
426. Both the second prong of the test proposed by Amici in Walton v. Arizona and the
Adamson Court's identification of the liability-creating function of the Arizona aggravating
circumstances are used to identify the elements of a new capital crime.
427. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88.
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the capital sentencing schemes currently used in the United States
employ sentencing factors in precisely this way. For example, the
Arizona capital sentencing statute provides that the court "shall
impose a sentence of death if the court finds one or more of the aggra-
vating circumstances enumerated . . . [and] there are no mitigating
circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." '428 If we set
aside for a moment the fact that the aggravating circumstances in the
Arizona statute function as both liability rules and as sentencing fac-
tors, and instead focus solely on their sentencing function, the sen-
tencing-factor aspect controls the sentencing court's discretion in
precisely the same way that the visible possession requirement func-
tioned under the Pennsylvania Act.4 29 *As long as a particular feature
of state law does not also operate to create new or enhanced liability
for punishment, the right to a jury trial does not attach. There may
be objections to controlling the sentencer's discretion by mandating a
particular sentence, but those objections are not rooted in the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial.43°
Although the distinctions drawn in McMillan generally support
the use of liability analysis to define "crime" and thus to determine
the right to a jury trial, Bloom v. Illinois43  more forcefully supports
it. In Bloom, which was a companion case to Duncan v. Louisiana,
the Court held that the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applied
to the adjudication of serious criminal contempt charges.432 Until
Bloom, the Court consistently had upheld the constitutional power of
the state and federal courts to punish any criminal contempt without
a jury trial.433 "Whether 'criminal contempt' really is or is not a
crime is a question as to which there has been much dispute.
434
Bloom ended this long debate, at least with respect to the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial:
Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a vio-
lation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both .... [C]onvictions for criminal contempt are
indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions, for their
impact on the individual defendant is the same. Indeed, the role of
428. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (1989).
429. See infra text accompanying notes 466-70.
430. See, e.g., People v. Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d 212, 758 P.2d 25, 250 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1988), cert.
granted sub nom. Boyde v. California, 58 U.S.L.W. 3043 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1989) (No. 88-6613)
(summarizing the issues pending before the Supreme Court).
431. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
432. A serious criminal contempt charge is one that does not fall within the "petty offense"
exception to the sixth amendment jury trial right recognized in Duncan. Id. at 211.
433. Id. at 195-97.
434. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 592 (3d ed. 1982).
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criminal contempt and that of many ordinary criminal laws seem
identical-protection of the institutions of our government and
enforcement of their mandates.
Given that criminal contempt is a crime in every fundamental
respect, the question is whether it is a crime to which the jury trial
provisions of the Constitution apply. We hold that it is, primarily
because in terms of those considerations which make the right to
jury trial fundamental in criminal cases, there is no substantial dif-
ference between serious contempts and other serious crimes.435
The Court thus found that criminal contempt is a "crime"
because: (1) it is a violation of the law punishable by fine or imprison-
ment; (2) a conviction for criminal contempt has the same impact on
the defendant as an ordinary criminal conviction; and (3) a conviction
for criminal contempt serves the same state interests as does a crimi-
nal conviction. Distilled to its essence, this means that a "crime" for
the purpose of the sixth amendment jury trial right is a rule that cre-
ates liability for (is a law which, when violated, is punishable by) the
criminal sanction (from the perspective of both the defendant and the
state). It is the liability function of any rule or factual finding, regard-
less of its name, that invokes the sixth amendment right to a jury trial,
provided, of course, that it creates liability for a "serious" '436 criminal
sanction.
Although precedent is not unequivocal on this question, the
inferred intention of the framers of the Constitution, Supreme Court
precedent, and the sixth amendment's purpose to thwart government
oppression all indicate that "crime" means a rule (or package of rules)
that creates liability for punishment.437
VI. CONCLUSION
A "crime" under the English common law is a factually based
rule (or a package of rules) that creates liability for punishment. A
crime either (1) creates liability for punishment for what was previ-
ously lawful conduct, or (2) creates liability for enhanced punishment
435. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201-02.
436. For a discussion of the sixth amendment's "petty offense" exception, see supra text
accompanying notes 114-15.
437. Because the aggravating circumstances in the "alternative formulation" of the Model
Penal Code's capital sentencing procedure and in the capital sentencing procedures of Arizona,
Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska function to create liability for punishment, they are "crimes"
within the meaning of the jury trial guarantee of the sixth amendment. Because these statutes
do not provide for jury determination of the existence or nonexistence of these aggravating
circumstances, these capital sentencing statutes violate defendants' rights to trial by jury. For
an analysis of the Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska capital sentencing statutes, see
infra Section VII (Appendix).
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for conduct already subject to a lesser punishment. In the former sit-
uation, the crime creates original liability (as with the original homi-
cide offense at common law); and in the latter situation (as with the
distinction between murder and manslaughter at common law), the
crime creates enhanced liability. These were evidently the lessons
gleaned from the common law tradition by the framers of the Consti-
tution as they crafted the right to trial by jury. This is the conception
of "crime" incorporated into the jury trial guarantee of Article III.
Furthermore, this conception of crime is the common root between
the Article III provision and the jury trial guarantee of the sixth
amendment. It is also the fundamental conception of crime we
embrace today.
The right to a jury trial has as its goal thwarting government
oppression by placing the "common-sense judgment of a jury"
between the charge brought and the punishment sought by govern-
ment.438 Government cannot eliminate enemies by a criminal prose-
cution (the oppression thwarted by the sixth amendment), unless the
government first makes the defendant liable for punishment in a trial
before a judge "too responsive to the voice of higher authority. '4 3
9
The sixth amendment, of course, was adopted when the fear of gov-
ernment oppression by the crown was demonstrable. But the voice of
"higher authority" which may be too responsively followed by judges
is not the voice of an executive officer alone. It may also be the voice
of "vindictiveness on the part of the people." 40 The sixth amend-
ment right to a jury trial thus also protects the accused from the
oppression made possible when a judge heeds the voice of "an indig-
nant people, roused into hatred by unfounded calumnies, or stimu-
lated to cruelty by bitter political enmities, or unmeasured
jealousies.' The fear of oppression fueled by the popular will is as
real today as it was when the sixth amendment was adopted. This is
especially true when the defendant is charged with a capital crime.
The right to trial by jury also protects the accused from "corrupt
or overzealous prosecutor[s] and against compliant, biased, or eccen-
tric judge[s]." 442 In other words, the right to trial by jury protects the
integrity and the legitimacy of ,the process of conviction which, in a
capital case, leads to the awesome sanction of taking the life of a fel-
low human being to further state policy. Since government oppres-
438. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
439. Id.
440. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 657 (abr.
ed. 1833).
441. Id.
442. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
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sion by the criminal sanction is possible only if the accused is first
held liable for punishment, the jury's exclusive power to find the facts
that invoke liability rules is the engine that thwarts oppression.
Furthermore, the conception of crime as a factually based rule
(or a package of rules) that creates liability for punishment serves the
goals of the sixth amendment while it permits legislative bodies free-
dom to define crimes in any way the legislative body sees fit. The
legislative body is restricted only in how it commands the facts to
function. If they function to create liability for punishment (original
or enhanced), then the sixth amendment requires a jury determination
of the truth of the charges brought against the defendant (unless a
jury is waived). If they perform any other task, then a jury determi-
nation is not required under the sixth amendment.
Finally, liability analysis simplifies the law for everyone. Legisla-
tive bodies will have only one easily applied rule to determine whether
a jury trial is necessary for any feature of the criminal law it may wish
to create. It need only be concerned with the work that it makes the
feature perform. The task of the courts is simplified as well. Under
liability analysis, courts do not "find" a new crime by struggling to
identify the "elements" of an offense, when none was intended by the
legislative body. Instead, the legislature is held responsible for noth-
ing more and nothing less than what it does. A court's only concern
is with how the particular feature of state law actually functions. If it
creates liability for punishment, then the sixth amendment guarantee
requires a jury trial of the facts that make punishment possible. If the
particular feature performs only other functions, a jury is not required
under the sixth amendment.
VII. APPENDIX: THE CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEDURES IN
ARIZONA, IDAHO, MONTANA, AND NEBRASKA
A. Arizona
In 1901, Arizona divided murder into two degrees, based on the
Pennsylvania formula. The death penalty was reserved for first
degree murder, and unfettered discretion to select between death or
imprisonment in the territorial prison for life was conferred on the
jury." 3 The Arizona Penal Code, which was adopted shortly after
Arizona was admitted into the Union,4" likewise divided murder into
two degrees, limited the death penalty to first degree murder, and
443. The Revised Statutes of Arizona Territory, Tit. VIII, Ch. 1, §§ 172-74. Sec. 174.
444. Arizona was admitted into the Union on February 14, 1912. The Council of State
Governments, 27 The Book Of The States, Table 10.2, p. 477 (1988).
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conferred unfettered discretion on the jury to fix the punishment at
death or life imprisonment."' With a few minor non-substantive
changes, these provisions were carried forward into the Arizona Code
of 1939,"6 and into the Criminal Code of 1956.47 On May 14, 1973,
Arizona became the fourteenth state to restore capital punishment in
the wake of Furman.448 The legislation repealed the death penalty as
a possible punishment for four crimes,449 expanded the definition of
first degree murder,"' and replaced unfettered capital sentencing dis-
cretion with a capital sentencing procedure451 "derived from the
Model Penal Code. '45 2 Thus, jury sentencing for first degree murder,
used in Arizona since 1901, was abandoned in the new legislation.
The available evidence suggests that it was abolished because of the
nearly universal rejection of jury sentencing in non-capital cases dur-
ing the latter half of the twentieth century,453 and because of the
widely held belief that jury sentencing in capital cases would violate
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment as
interpreted in Furman v. Georgia. Upon conviction of the redefined
capital crime of first degree murder, a sentencing hearing must be
held. The trial judge was, and still is, the sole sentencing authority in
445. ARIz. REV. STAT. 1901, Penal Code §§ 172-174 (1901).
446. Ariz. Code of 1939, §§ 43-2901 to 43-2903 (1940). Sections 170 and 171 of the 1913
Penal Code were combined into a single section (Section 43-2901) in the Code of 1939, and
several changes were made in the punctuation. Sections 43-2902 and 43-2903 of the Code of
1939 are identical to Sections 172 and 173 of the Penal Code of 1916. Id.
447. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-451 to 13-453 (1956).
448. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 138, 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws 966; see Poulos, supra note 42, at
239 table 1.
449. These four crimes were: (1) assault with a deadly weapon or force by a life prisoner,
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-250 (1973); (2) kidnapping, id. § 13-492; (3) boarding or
interfering with a train with the intent to rob, id. § 13-644; and (4) depositing or exploding
explosives with the intent to injure persons or property, id. § 13-922. See Act of May 14, 1973,
ch. 138, §§ 3, 6-8, 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws 967, 970-72.
450. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 138, § 1, 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws 966-67. The definition of first
degree murder was expanded to include a murder committed "in avoiding or preventing lawful
arrest or effecting an escape from custody," and the first degree felony murder rule was
expanded by adding kidnapping and the sexual molestation of a child under the age of thirteen
years; nonetheless, the death penalty for felony-murder-rape was confined to rape in the first
degree. Id.
451. Id. § 5.
452. State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 53, 659 P.2d 1, 12 (1983). The Arizona provision is
derived from the "alternative formulation of Subsection (2)" of Section 210.6 of the Model
Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1980). In this formulation, the trial judge is
the sole sentencing authority.
453. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.02; 3 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard
18-1.1 (2d ed. 1980); MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 3-206(c) (Uniform Law
Comm'rs 1979); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, Courts, Standards 5.1, 16.8(1)
(National Advisory Comm. 1973).
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Arizona.4 4  The statute enumerated six aggravating circumstances
and four mitigating circumstances. 4 "1 The burden of proving the
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt was placed on
the prosecution,456 whereas the defense had the burden of proving the
existence of the enumerated mitigating circumstances by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.457 The trial court was required to return a spe-
cial verdict setting forth its findings as to the existence or
nonexistence of each of the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances.458 The sentencing decision was to be made as follows:
In determining whether to impose a sentence of death or life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. . ., the court shall take
into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances ... and
shall impose a sentence of death if the court finds one or more of
the aggravating circumstances enumerated ... and that there are
no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency.459
This provision makes a death sentence the mandatory punish-
ment for first degree murder when the court finds the existence of one
of the enumerated aggravating circumstances and finds either that
there is no mitigating circumstance or that there is no mitigating cir-
cumstance sufficiently substantial to call for a sentence of less than
death. 6°
In 1977, Arizona adopted a revised penal code,461' but the revised
code made no substantive changes in the capital sentencing proce-
dure.462 Although amendments to the capital sentencing procedure
have been made from time to time, none of these amendments are
relevant to this discussion.463
454. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 138, § 5, 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws 968-69.
455. Id.
456. Id. § 5(B).
457. Id.
458. Id. § 5(C).
459. Id. § 5(D).
460. See infra note 464.
461. Act of May 31, 1977, ch. 142, 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws 678.
462. Id. § 58. Section 13-454 was renumbered as Section 13-902, and several stylistic and
conforming amendments were made to these provisions. Id.
463. In 1978, the legislature renumbered the capital sentencing procedure section. Act of
June 9, 1978, ch. 201, § 104, 1978 Ariz. Sess. Laws. Former Section 13-902 was renumbered
as Section 13-703. This is its current designation in the Arizona Criminal Code. ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (1978). That same year the incarcerated-defendant aggravating
circumstance was added to the original list of six aggravating circumstances. Act of June 15,
1978, ch. 215, § 2, 1978 Ariz. Sess. Laws.
The legislature added an eighth aggravating circumstance, multiple-contemporaneous-
homicides, in 1984, Act of April 6, 1984, ch. 66, § 1, 1984 Ariz. Sess. Laws, a ninth
aggravating circumstance, adult-defendant-child-victim, in 1985, Act of May 16, 1985, ch.
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Arizona's aggravating circumstances impose a mandatory sen-
tence of death whenever the court makes two findings: first, that the
prosecution has proved the existence of one or more of the aggravat-
ing circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; and, second, that the
defense has not proved the existence of a mitigating circumstance or
that any mitigating circumstance proved by the defense is not suffi-
ciently substantial to call for leniency.4" Conversely, the statute pro-
hibits the death penalty "[w]here none of the statutory aggravating
circumstances are found to be present. ' 4 65 The aggravating circum-
stances, standing alone, thus function both to create liability for the
death penalty and to impose an automatic sentence of death. Never-
theless, according to the Arizona Supreme Court, the aggravating cir-
cumstances "merely [set] forth guidelines for the determination of
punishment after one is convicted of first degree murder." '466 In other
words, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that Arizona's aggravat-
ing circumstances are sentencing factors alone. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court applied "element analysis" in the traditional
manner. The court did not analyze the function that the aggravating
circumstances actually performed.46 7
Since Arizona's aggravating circumstances function to create lia-
bility for the punishment of death-since a sentence of death can only
be imposed upon a finding of the existence of at least one special cir-
cumstance-the aggravating circumstances are liability rules under
liability analysis.46 Accordingly, the determination of the existence
364, § 8, 1985 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1438, and a tenth aggravating circumstance, peace-officer-
murder, in 1988, Act of June 6, 1988, ch. 155, § 1, 1988 Ariz. Sess. Laws 724. Thus, from its
original adoption on May 14, 1973, to December 1, 1989, the structure of Arizona's capital
sentencing procedure remained unchanged. The major substantive amendments have added
four aggravating circumstances to the original list of six.
464. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (1989); e.g., State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 246-
47, 762 P.2d 519, 533-34 (1988); State v. Gillies, 142 Ariz. 564, 568, 691 P.2d 655, 659 (1984);
State v. Zaragoza, 135 Ariz. 63, 69, 659 P.2d 22, 28 (1983); State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 54,
659 P.2d 1, 13 (1983).
465. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 54, 659 P.2d at 13. This rule is typically invoked when the
Arizona Supreme Court finds that the trial court erroneously found the existence of all of the
aggravating circumstance, and as a consequence, the Arizona Supreme Court reverses the
death penalty. E.g., State v. Madsen, 125 Ariz. 346, 609 P.2d 1046 (1980); State v. Lujan, 124
Ariz. 365, 604 P.2d 629 (1979).
466. State v. Blazak, 114 Ariz. 199, 206,*560 P.2d 54, 61 (1977).
467. Id.
468. This is undeniably true. On its face, the statute provides that aggravating
circumstances perform a liability function. Furthermore, under the common law, the
substantive rules defining the crime of murder functioned to create liability for the death
penalty and to impose an automatic sentence of death in exactly the same way that the
aggravating circumstances function to impose liability for the death penalty. Indeed, this was
true in England from ancient times until the death penalty was abolished in 1965. See supra
text accompanying notes 11-17. The death penalty was permanently abolished in England in
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or nonexistence of the aggravating circumstances must be made by a
1970. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. Aside from the details of the definition of the
aggravating circumstances in the two statutes, there are only three distinctions between the
Arizona statute and the British Homicide Act. First, the British statute candidly recognized
that the aggravating circumstances enumerated in the Act subdivided the old capital offense of
murder into a capital and noncapital crime. In other words, the aggravating circumstances in
the Homicide Act defined a new offense of capital murder. See supra text accompanying notes
15-17. In contrast, the Arizona Supreme Court has said that the Arizona statute does not
create a new offense of capital murder. Blazak, 114 Ariz. at 206, 560 P.2d at 61. Second, the
British jury determined the existence or nonexistence of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in the British statute. In the Arizona statute, that determination is made solely by
the trial judge. Third, the existence or nonexistence of the aggravating circumstances of the
Homicide Act were litigated in the guilt phase of a trial, whereas the existence or nonexistence
of the aggravating circumstances is litigated in a subsequent sentencing hearing (a penalty
phase) under the Arizona statute.
This was also true in the states that responded to Furman by enacting mandatory death
penalty statutes. As noted above, 22 states enacted mandatory death penalty statutes in their
initial response to Furman. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89. In 14 of these states,
eligibility for a mandatory death sentence was dependent upon the existence or nonexistence of
enumerated "aggravating circumstances." In each of these states, the post-Furman legislation
either divided a previously unitary offense into various degrees or redefined the pre-Furman
law into capital and noncapital murder. The division between the highest degree of noncapital
murder and capital murder was accomplished by the use of aggravating circumstances. For a
discussion of these statutes, see Poulos, supra note 42, at 207-13.
Though there was a difference in their respective names, the "aggravating circumstances"
and the "special circumstances" functioned in precisely the same way: They defined eligibility
for the mandatory death sentence. See id. at 222-25. Furthermore, both the "aggravating
circumstances" and the "special circumstances" operated in the same manner as the definition
of murder at common law and the circumstances enumerated in the British Homicide Act,
defining liability for the dealth penalty and imposing the death sentence. As with the British
Homicide Act, the existence or nonexistence of the "aggravating circumstances" and the
"special circumstances" was also determined by the jury. Finally, it was undeniable that these
"aggravating circumstances" and "special circumstances" created liability rules or "crimes"
under the liability analysis discussed above. See id. at 223-25. In the states that adopted
mandatory capital punishment and used the term "aggravating circumstances," the same three
distinctions that differentiated the Arizona statute from the British Homicide Act separate the
Arizona statute from these mandatory capital punishment statutes. First, the aggravating
circumstance of the mandatory statutes obviously created substantive rules which defined an
offense of capital murder, whereas the Arizona Supreme Court has held that the aggravating
circumstances in the Arizona statute do not create a new capital offense of "aggravated first
degree murder;" rather, the statute "merely sets forth guidelines for the determination of
punishment after one is convicted of first degree murder." Blazak, 114 Ariz. at 206, 560 P.2d
at 61. In other words, the Arizona statute only creates sentencing rules according to the
Arizona Supreme Court. Second, the jury determined the existence or nonexistence of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the mandatory death penalty statutes, whereas that
determination is made solely by the trial judge under the Arizona statute. Third, the existence
or nonexistence of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in the mandatory death penalty
statutes is litigated during the guilt-innocence determination (guilt phase), whereas the
existence or nonexistence of the aggravating circumstances is litigated in a subsequent
sentencing hearing (a penalty phase) under the Arizona statute. See supra text accompanying
notes 454-59. Although these same three features distinguished the mandatory "special
circumstance" death penalty statutes from the Arizona statute, there was a fourth distinction
between these statutes and the Arizona law. The name given to the legal device that both
established liability for the death penalty and imposed the death penalty was different. The
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jury under the sixth amendment. Since the Arizona statute provides
that this determination is to be made by the trial court, the Arizona
capital sentencing procedure violates the offender's sixth amendment
right to a jury trial in precisely the same way that the "alternative
formulation" of the Model Penal Code's sentencing procedure vio-
lates the sixth amendment. 469 Even if an interest balancing test is
applied after it is determined that the sixth amendment right attaches,
the interests of the State do not outweigh the right to a jury trial.
47 ° If
Arizona wishes to retain judicial sentencing in capital cases, it has two
options. First, Arizona can provide for the determination of the exist-
ence or nonexistence of the aggravating circumstances by the jury in
the guilt phase of the trial. Once a jury makes that determination, the
trial court may use the aggravating circumstances as sentencing fac-
tors at the sentencing hearing. The second option is to amend the
statute to remove the liability function that the aggravating circum-
stances now perform. The aggravating circumstances would then per-
form only a sentencing function, and the determination of their
existence or nonexistence could be made by the trial court under
Hildwin. Although there may be other objections to this approach,
stripping the liability function from the aggravating circumstances
would satisfy the sixth amendment guarantee, for no longer would
there be a danger of government oppression. As the Arizona capital
sentencing procedure now stands, the liability function of the aggra-
vating circumstances violates the sixth amendment right to a jury
trial.
B. Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska
1. IDAHO
The Idaho capital sentencing procedures are essentially the same
as those of Arizona.
Where a person is convicted of an offense which may be pun-
ishable by death, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless
the court finds at least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance.
Where the court finds a statutory aggravating circumstance the
court shall sentence the defendant to death unless the court finds
that mitigating circumstances which may be presented outweigh
the gravity of any aggravating circumstance found and make impo-
sition of death unjust.471
legal device was called a "special circumstance" in these mandatory death penalty statutes and
an "aggravating circumstance" in the Arizona statute.
469. See supra text accompanying notes 332-437.
470. See supra text accompanying notes 367-98.
471. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(c) (1987).
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The trial court determines the existence or nonexistence of the aggra-
vating circumstances at the sentencing hearing.472 Using traditional
element analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the aggra-
vating circumstances "are not elements of first degree murder," and
thus there is no right to a jury trial of their existence or nonexistence
under the sixth amendment. 3
2. MONTANA
The Montana capital sentencing procedure likewise provides for
the determination of the aggravating circumstances by the trial court
alone at a sentencing hearing.474 Montana's aggravating circum-
stances function in the same way as those in the Model Penal Code,
the Arizona code, and the Idaho code:
In determining whether to impose a sentence of death or imprison-
ment, the court shall take into account the aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances enumerated in 46-18-303 and 46-18-304 and
shall impose a sentence of death if it finds one or more of the aggra-
vating circumstances and finds that there are no mitigating circum-
475stances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency....
Like the Supreme Courts of Arizona and Idaho, the Montana
Supreme Court has employed traditional element analysis to conclude
that "the aggravating circumstances found against the defendant are
related to sentencing only, and are not elements of the crimes
charged. . . . We conclude that the defendant was not entitled to a
jury determination of whether the aggravating circumstances were
present in this case."
476
3. NEBRASKA
The Nebraska capital sentencing procedure differs from the capi-
tal sentencing procedure of Arizona, Idaho, and Montana in several
ways. The sentencing authority in Nebraska is either the trial judge
or a panel of three judges, 477 and the aggravating circumstances func-
tion as sentencing factors in materially different ways than in the
other three states.478 But Nebraska's aggravating circumstances func-
472. Id. § 19-2515(d).
473. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 145-47, 774 P.2d 299, 315-17 (1989).
474. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (1989).
475. Id. § 46-18-305.
476. State v. Dawson, 233 Mont. 345, 358, 761 P.2d 352, 360 (1988).
477. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1985).
478. In Nebraska, the mitigating circumstances need not outweigh the aggravating
circumstances to warrant a judgment of less than death. Id. § 29-2522; State v. Stewart, 197
Neb. 497, 526, 250 N.W.2d 849, 866 (1977). Consequently, the death penalty is not made
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tion to create liability for the death penalty in exactly the same way
that the aggravating circumstances function to create liability for the
death penalty in Arizona, Idaho, and Montana:
The Legislature therefor[e] determines that the death penalty
should be imposed only for the crimes set forth in section 28-303
and, in addition, that it shall only be imposed in those instances
when the aggravating circumstances existing in connection with
the crime outweigh the mitigating circumstances, as set forth in
sections 29-2520 to 29-2524.
After hearing all of the evidence and arguments in the sen-
tencing proceeding, the judge or judges shall fix the sentence at
either death or life imprisonment, but such determination shall be
based upon the following considerations:
(1) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify
imposition of a sentence of death; ... 47
The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that there must be a valid
finding of at least one aggravating circumstance before an offender is
liable for a sentence of death.4"' In other words, the Nebraska aggra-
vating circumstances function to create liability for the death penalty.
Nevertheless, without considering how the aggravating circumstances
actually function in Nebraska, the Nebraska Supreme Court has
employed traditional element analysis and has concluded that the
Nebraska statute does not violate a defendant's sixth amendment
right to a jury trial.481
C. Conclusion
The Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska aggravating circumstances
thus function in precisely the same way that the aggravating circum-
stances function in the Arizona capital sentencing procedure and in
the capital sentencing procedure set forth in the Model Penal Code's
"alternative formulation." Because they function to create liability
for the death penalty, and because they do not provide for jury deter-
mination of the existence .or nonexistence of the aggravating circum-
mandatory if mitigation does not outweigh aggravation, as in the other three states. Id. But
cf NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2519.
479. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2519.
480. State v. Hunt, 220 Neb. 707, 371 N.W.2d 708 (1985). In Hunt, the court said: "Since
no aggravating circumstance as defined in § 29-2523 exists, the sentence of death must be, and
hereby is, set aside and vacated. The cause is remanded for resentencing in accordance with
law." Id. at 724, 371 N.W.2d at 721.
481. State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 126, 444 N.W.2d 610, 643 (1989); see, e.g., State v. Palmer,
224 Neb. 282, 305-09, 399 N.W.2d 706, 724-25 (1986); State v. Moore, 210 Neb. 457, 463, 316
N.W.2d 33, 37 (1982); State v. Anderson, 207 Neb. 51, 72, 296 N.W.2d 440, 453 (1980); see
also State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 559-60, 250 N.W.2d 881, 887-88 (1977).
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stances, these stitutory'schemes violate the sixth amendment right to
a jury trial. This is so for precisely the same reasons that the aggra-
vating circumstances in the Arizona statute and in the Model Penal
Code's "alternative formulation" of its capital sentencing procedure
violate the sixth amendment.482
482. See supra text accompanying notes 382-437.
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